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ABSTRACT 
 
Yan Shi: Essays on Applications of Information Economics  
 (Under the direction of Gary Biglaiser and Sérgio Parreiras) 
 
This dissertation studies the issue of asymmetric information in the manner of how 
much information should be disclosed by the better informed party to reach a 
socially optimal outcome, then how to design a mechanism to achieve such a goal. It 
contains two essays.   
The first essay extends the study of competitive bidding with asymmetric 
information to a two period bidding game where the informed bidder has private 
information in both periods and the uninformed bidder has only access to public 
information.  Assuming that the seller has access to the second period information 
received by the informed bidder.  I show that when the seller commits to publicizing 
the second period information the informed bidder’s information advantage is 
diminished, thus compared with the scenario that the seller commits to not 
disclosing the second period information, the informed bidder has less incentive to 
wait and tends to bid immediately while the uninformed one does the exact opposite. 
I also find that setting low reserve prices maximizes the seller’s revenue and the 
seller is never worse off by making the second period information public.   
The second essay examines the problems faced by governments in releasing 
private information about epidemics like SARS, bird flu. Because of the potential 
panic caused by the disclosure of such information, governments must decide 
whether to reveal the news precisely as they receive it or communicate only part of 
 iii 
it. The payoff externalities play an important role in the optimal policy implemented 
by a government.  I show that disclosure is likely to be less desirable when, at a 
certain level of precautionary actions, costs from panic increase dramatically or the 
precautionary action taken by the public hardly improves the danger of the 
epidemic’s center. On the other hand, if costs from panic increase at a decreasing 
rate and the precautionary action decreases the probability of becoming infected at 
an increasing rate, it is always desirable for the government to disclose everything. 
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Chapter I
Dynamic Auctions with Asymmetric Information and
an Application to Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)
Auctions
1 Introduction
When the federal government auctions oil and gas leases on the Outer Conti-
nental Shelf (OCS), it frequently offers different leases within the same offshore
area every two or three years. In November 2005, Mineral Management Service
(MMS) released news of seeking updated information for its next Beaufort Sea
lease sale. The next lease sale, which would be the third of the three sales in the
5-year program for the Beaufort area, is scheduled for March 2007. The other
two sales were held in September 2003 and March 2005. The firms which won
the previous sale (neighbor firms) may not have drilled the well by the time
of the next sale.1 Under these circumstances, the neighbor firms can submit
an aggressive bid on the next sale based on private seismic survey or geological
data collected and risk the possibility of not finding any deposit. Or they can
either not bid or submit a very low bid with an intention to wait for subsequent
information on production potential of the purchased lease to decide and hope
that no one gets the lease and the sale is reoffered later on.2 The motivation of
my study is to explain the incidence of waiting behavior of the informed bidder
in a dynamic setting and study the optimal information disclosing mechanism
1 Porter (1995) reported that only 39% of the tracts receiving bids in the period
1954-79 were productive. For the sake of high risks of sinking a dry well and
considerable drilling costs, firms often delay drilling and hope for a free ride on
other firms’ drilling decisions.
2 In OCS auctions, there may be an announced minimum bid. However, based
on its private estimate of the value of the tract, the federal government can still
reject the highest bid if they think the bid is too low. A rejected lease is usually
reoffered in two to three years.
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for the seller. In the case of OCS auctions, should the neighbor firms wait? Is
there any incentive for non-neighbor firms to enter the auction? If the govern-
ment has access to the information received by the neighbor firms about the
well from the early sale, should it disclose it?
The purpose of the paper is to address these issues and investigate how
the private information affects both neighbor and non-neighbor firms’ behavior
and the revenue accrued by the government. There are two major reasons to
concentrate on this line of research. First, one of the features of OCS leasing
program is that the government sometimes rejects winning bids and re-offers
the sale of the same tract in the future. It is important for the bidders to take
account of this possibility when they submit a bid, because information may be
revealed about the tract to the purchasers of neighboring tracts by the time of a
reoffering. More importantly, this information may become known to the seller
as well. Second, the implications can be applied to many other situations or
other auction markets. For example, we often observe a start-up firm entering
a new product market while an incumbent in a closely related market waits
in order to learn more about the prospects of the new market. An example
is when competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) took the initiative in the
Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) market while the region’s incumbent (Ameritech)
waited. Questions arise from allowing parties to gain more information later on.
How does the future information affect both parties’ present behaviors? Is the
incumbent going to act right away or wait for more accurate information on
the new market but to bear the possibility of being the follower and earning a
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smaller market share? What can the government do to improve the outcome?
To answer these questions, I introduce a two-period competitive bidding
game. By allowing a dynamic setting, waiting accentuates the informed bidder’s
information advantage, but incurs a cost for the informed bidder because of the
risk of losing the object. The natural question is: Is it in the seller’s interest to
encourage bidding in the first period, especially when the seller has access to the
second period information and has the option to disclose it? My goal here is to
study such a problem with the interplay between waiting for extra information
and competitive bidding.
Previous theoretical and empirical studies on auctions with asymmetric in-
formation have mainly focused on the first price, sealed bid auction in a one
shot game. Competitive bidding under asymmetric information was first stud-
ied by Woods (1965) in a setting of an offshore oil auction. He examined two
major oil companies’ bidding behaviors and found that the firm which owned
the right of an adjacent tract bid while the other firm, which had only imper-
fect seismic information, did not bid. Motivated by his empirical work, Wilson
(1967) introduced a theoretical model of a first-price, sealed bid auction. Sub-
sequently, Weverbergh (1979) and Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom and Weber
(1983) (EMW hereafter) furthered theoretical analysis on competitive bidding
under asymmetric information. EMW show that the informed bidder’s bid-
ding distribution is the same as the distribution of the maximum of the others’
bids and that the uninformed bidders earn zero expected profit in a one shot
game. Following that, Mead, Moseidjord and Sorensen (1984) (MMS hereafter)
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and Hendricks and Porter (1988) provide empirical evidence to suggest that
neighbor firms are better informed than non-neighbor firms and both firms bid
strategically according to Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. Furthermore, Milgrom
and Weber (1983) extend the model of EMW (1983) by incorporating informa-
tion acquisition and information disclosure. They show that the informed bidder
prefers to gather information overtly whereas the uninformed bidder prefers to
gather information covertly, and that the seller prefers to adopt a policy of
disclosing the information that is affiliated with the buyers’ valuations.
This paper is also related to the literature on auctions with reoffering feature.
The seller’s strategic behavior in such a dynamic auction has been studied by
Wang (1993), Horstmann & LaCasse (1997) and McAfee & Vincent (1997).
Wang (1993) considers a two-period common-value auction in which the seller
possesses some private information at the first period whereas bidders receive
some private information at the second period. They show that, at equilibrium,
the seller sets a low reserve price when he receives unfavorable information and
sets a high reserve price otherwise. The result holds in both cases when the
seller fully reveals the information and fully conceals the information at the
second period. His results also suggest that the seller benefits from committing
the sale in the first period. His paper differs from this paper in that bidders
are symmetrically informed and the reserve price serves as a signaling device.
McAfee & Vincent (1997) studies a sequential sale of a common value object
to symmetrically informed bidders. They show that when the discounting goes
to zero, seller’s expected revenue converges to that of a static auction with
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no reserve price, and that with many bidders, the equilibrium reserve price
approaches the reserve price in an optimal static auction. Similar to Wang
(1993) and McAfee & Vincent (1997), Horstmann & LaCasse (1997) also studies
a common-value auction with symmetrically informed bidders. They offer an
explanation for the joint use of secret reserve prices and reoffering, and predict
that, on average, prices of items sold rise as delay in reoffering increases.
In this paper, I wed the literature on auctions with reoffering feature and the
literature on auctions with asymmetic information to analyze the problem from
both the bidders’ and the seller’s perspectives. In my model, the seller auc-
tions an indivisible common-valued object for which there are two bidders, the
informed bidder and the uninformed bidder. The informed bidder receives pri-
vate information in two consecutive periods and the uninformed bidder only re-
ceives public information. Since the informed bidder receives additional private
information in the second period, he faces the tradeoff of bidding immediately
and waiting for subsequent information. By bidding immediately, he enhances
the probability of getting the object, but risks misinterpreting the value of the
object. Alternatively, if he does not bid in the first period, he may not get the
object if the uninformed bidder bids on it, but he can better estimate the value
of the object in the second period. Therefore, the informed bidder must act
strategically. His decision, of course, depends on the reserve price and the value
of the signal received in the first period. When the value of the first period’s sig-
nal is relatively high compared to the reserve price, waiting is costly because the
expected loss from losing the object outweighs the expected benefit of knowing
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the value of the object for certain, so we expect him to initiate action. On the
other hand, when the value of the first period signal is relatively low compared
to the reserve price, the informed bidder has the most to gain from waiting, so
he will delay bidding.
In my model, the seller has access to the second period information. I
consider two scenarios concerning the second period information observed by
the seller: He either commits to disclose or commits to not disclose the second
period information before the first period. Assuming both information signals
follow a uniform distribution, I show that in either scenario, at a low reserve
price, the seller maximizes the expected revenue and the object is sold in the
first period. Since the informed bidder is better informed in the second round,
waiting decreases uncertainty so that he better estimates the value of the object,
thus he benefits the most from waiting. This implies that from a seller’s point
of view the less waiting the less rents the informed bidder can extract and
the better return for the seller. Setting low reserve prices encourages both
bidders to bid in the first period, thus it avoids the informed bidder gaining
extra information in the second period. Consequently, it decreases the informed
bidder’s expected profits and increases the seller’s ex ante revenue. This result
provides an explanation to why in OCS auctions the government has been setting
low reserve prices.3
Moreover, I compare the seller’s revenue in two scenarios and show that the
seller is never worse off by making the second period information public. The
3 McAfee and Vincent (1992) suggest that the government has been setting re-
serve prices considerably lower than the optimal reserve prices in OCS auctions.
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intuition follows from the linkage principle by Milgrom and Weber (1982), which
states that a seller always benefits from disclosing information that is affiliated
to the value of the object. In this case, making the second period information
public in a sense subsidizes the uninformed bidder by reducing the information
asymmetries between them. It elicits bidding from the uninformed bidder who
would otherwise never bid in the second round. Hence, the competition is
triggered in the second round and the seller benefits from more competitive
bids from the informed bidder.
Additionally, I study how the ex ante revenue is affected if the seller can
somehow commit to sell either in the first period or the second period. The
rationale from the two period game mostly carries over to the one period game
where the seller sells the object in the first period. The optimal reserve price
still proves to be lower than the expected value of the second period signal and
the maximized ex ante revenue remains unchanged. However, if the auction is
conducted in the second period, depending on whether the seller commits to
disclosing the second period information or not, the optimal reserve price may
not be at low level and the maximized ex ante revenue may be lower than the
one in the two period game. Nevertheless, I show that the maximized expected
revenue in the one period game can be reached in the two period game as well.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section
3 presents the equilibrium strategies for both scenarios where the government
commits to not disclosing or commits to disclosing the second period informa-
tion. Section 4 investigates the seller’s revenue for a simple case where both
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information signals follow a uniform distribution. First, I compare the seller’s
revenue between the two scenarios and derive the optimal reserve price. Then,
I study the situations if the object is sold only in the first or second period and
compare the seller’s revenue among different cases. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
The paper considers the sale of an object by a first price, sealed bid auction with
asymmetrically informed bidders I and U. The sale opens in two consecutive
periods, indexed by t = 1, 2. Bidder I observes a private signal V1 in the first
period and a private signal V2 in the second period while bidder U receives
only public information in both periods and the seller observes V2 in the second
period.4 The object has a common value V = V1+V2. Thus, the informed bidder
knows the value of the object with certainty in the second period.5 I assume
both bidders are risk-neutral and signals received by I are nonnegative and have
finite expectations. I also assume that the signals are drawn independently from
two distributions which are common knowledge.6 There is no discounting in this
4 Since both bidders and seller observe public information, I can leave the pub-
lic information variable out of the model without changing the nature of the
problem.
5 The assumption that V = V1 + V2 is made to simplify the exposition. The
implication of my results would not be changed if it were assumed that both
signals are postively correlated with V .
6 The assumption that the signals received by the informed bidder are inde-
pendent is made to obtain a clear characterization of the equilibrium and its
properties. The behavior implication would be the same were it assumed that
the signals are affiliated, as long as the degree of affiliation is ‘weak’ and the
informed bidder still has the incentive to wait for subsequent information.
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game.
The seller sets a constant reserve price r for both periods.7 At the beginning
of period 1, each firm independently decides whether to bid in that period or
wait until the next period. If any bidder bids in the first period, the bidder with
the high bid will win the object and the auction ends. If neither bidder bids
in period 1, the auction opens at the second period and each bidder once again
decides whether to bid and how much to bid. The auction ends by the end of
the second period.
The main feature of this model is that the sum of information received in
both periods by I provides a sufficient estimate for the value of the object. In
the application of OCS auctions, if the neighbor firm has drilled the previously
purchased tracts, the information revealed from drilling plus the private seismic
surveys conducted earlier are considered to be sufficient to predict the deposit
potential of adjacent tracts. The assumption that non-neighbor firms have only
publicly announced geological data may be somewhat unrealistic, however, as
long as the neighbor firms are far more informed than non-neigbor firms, the
model is likely to induce similar behavior strategies. Another assumption made
in the model is that the reserve price is same in both periods. In OCS auctions,
the same winning bid will be rejected again if it were to be rejected in the first
7 In OCS auctions, the government employs a ‘secret reserve price’ in the sense
that the government reserves the right to reject even if the highest bid is above
the announced minimum price. The discussion of optimal secret reserve price
is beyond the reach of this paper. For the analysis on secret reserve prices,
see Horstmann and LaCasse (1993), Wang (1993), Vincent (1995) and working
paper by Li and Tan.
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period. So the assumption of the same reserve price in both periods appears to
be reasonable.
Additionally, it is assumed that there is only one uninformed bidder and
one informed bidder. The number of uninformed bidders is not very important
because the equilibrium strategies depend on the distribution function of the
maximum of the bids from the uninformed bidders. As for the informed bid-
ders, empirical evidence suggests that they often submit joint bids and reach
a unitization agreement (an agreement on how to allocate revenues and costs
among firms).
3 Bidders’ Equilibrium Strategies
I start with considering a benchmark case of the equilibrium strategies in a one
period game where one bidder has perfect information about the value of the
object while the uninformed bidder does not know anything. Understanding a
one period game helps to derive properties and find equilibrium strategies for a
two period game.
3.1 A One Period Game
Let V be the value of the object with support [0, v] and F (v) be the cumulative
probability distribution. An equlibrium of this game is a pair of strategies
(β, H) for bidder I and bidder U such that β(v) solves bidder I’s problem for
every realization of v and H maximizes bidder U’s expected payoff which is
(E(V |β(v) < s) − s)H(s). Following EMW (1983), the equilibrium strategies
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are stated as follows:
Theorem 1 The Bayesian Nash equilibrium when E(V |V < v) > r is:
• Bidder I bids according to the strategy β(v) =


E(V |V < v) v > v˜
r r ≤ v ≤ v˜
0 v < r
• Bidder U chooses a bid from {0} ∪ (r,E(V |V < v)] according to the cu-
mulative probability distribution H(b) :
H(b) = Pr(bU ≤ b) =


F (v˜) b ≤ r
F (β−1(b)) b > r
where v˜ is the value of the signal such that E(V |V < v˜) = r.
Theorem 1 extends the theorem by EMW (1983) to asymmetrically informed
auctions with a reserve price and is a restatement of the theorem provided by
Hendricks and Porter (1988). It states that when the reserve price is lower than
the expected value of the signal V , bidder I bids monontonically according to the
signal V and bidder U mixes between bidding and not bidding. The equilibrium
strategy of bidder I on (r,E(V |V < v] is determined by the condition that, in
equilibrium, bidder U must earn zero profits. Since β−1(b) is strictly increasing
in b ∈ (r,E(V |V < v)], there is a unique v such that v = β−1(b). Suppose
bidder U submits a bid b ∈ (r,E(V |V < v)], then his expected payoff if he wins
is
E(V |β(V ) < b)− b = E(V |V < β−1(b))− b (1)
Setting expression (1) equal to zero yields β(v) = E(V |V < v). To induce the
aforementioned bidder I’s strategies, bidder U has to choose the same distribu-
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tion function above the reserve price. Thus, bidders’ bidding distributions are
almost identical except on two aspects. Firstly, I’s bids range from the reserve
price to E(V |V < v) whereas U bids above the reserve price. Secondly, the
probability of I not bidding, F (r), is less than the probability of U not bidding,
F (v˜). The difference of the probabilities of not bidding is due to the fact that
the bidding distribution of I possesses a mass point at the reserve price. At
equilibrium, I earns positive profits while U earns zero profits.
Theorem 2 The Bayesian Nash equilibrium when E(V |V < v) ≤ r is:
• Bidder I bids according to the strategy β(v) =


r v ≥ r
0 v < r
• Bidder U does not bid.
When E(V |V < v) ≤ r, bidder U will never want to bid above the reserve
price since any bid above the reserve price earns him negative profit. Suppose
bidder U’s strategy is to bid r, the optimal response of bidder I is to bid slightly
above r if the signal is above that, and not bid otherwise. This implies that
bidder U will only win when the expected value is lower than r. Therefore, U
loses money by bidding r. As a result, bidder I bids the lowest price and makes
positive profits and bidder U never bids.
Theorem 1 and 2 show the equilibrium strategies in a one shot game where
one bidder has perfect information about the value of the object while the other
one does not know anything. One might wonder about the incentive of the
uninformed bidder to bid when the expected value of the object is above r. If
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the uninformed one does not bid, the optimal response of the informed one is
to bid r. But knowing that the informed one bids r, the uninformed one will
bid slightly above r. So not bidding cannot be the equilibrium strategy for the
uninformed bidder. Meanwhile, it also cannot be the case that the uninformed
bidder follows pure strategies. If the uninformed bidder bids a certain value,
the informed bidder will bid slightly above that whenever the signal is higher
than the uninformed bidder’s bid. So the uninformed bidder will only win when
the signal is below his bid and he will take a loss. Therefore, the uninformed
bidder has to use mixed strategies.
3.2 A Two Period Game
Now I turn to the discussion of the two period game in which the seller has
access to the information received by the informed bidder in the second period.
Without commitment, the seller may adopt a policy of disclosure if the informa-
tion is favorable and nondisclosure otherwise. Then the public would perceive
perfectly when the information is not favorable. In equilibrium, it may be im-
possible for the seller to hide information. Thus, I will focus on the analysis of
an ex ante commitment policy. I consider two possible ex ante commitment
policies: the seller commits to not disclosing anything in the second period and
the seller commits to disclosing v2 in the second period.
8 I first derive some
8 There are many possible ex ante commitment policies if the seller adopts a
mixed strategy of disclosing the information with a probability α ∈ (0, 1).
The behavior implications under such a policy can be easily obtained by an-
alyzing two extreme scenarios, no-information-disclosing and full-information-
disclosing.
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general properties for the equilibrium strategies in both scenarios, then I focus
on the equlibrium strategies in each scenario respectively.
I assume random variables V1 and V2 follow atomless distributions.
9 Define
F1(v1) and F2(v2) as the cumulative probabilities of signal V1 and V2 with sup-
port [0, v1] and [0, v2]. For the convenience of notation, I denote E1 = E(V1|V1 <
v1) , E2 = E(V2|V2 < v2) and Ev1 = E(V1|V1 < v1).
Lemma 1 Bidder U earns zero profit and plays mixed strategies whenever he
bids.
The intuition follows closely the implication in the one period game. Since
bidder U has no private information in the first period, in any Nash equilibrium
in which he plays mixed strategies in the first period, he must earn zero profit if
he wins in the first period. Suppose bidder U makes positive expected profits
in the first period, then he will never want to wait until the next period and the
game becomes a one shot game. However, as mentioned in the last section, the
expected profits of the uninformed bidder can only be zero in a one shot game.
Therefore, bidder U earns zero profits in both periods.
Given that first period signal follows a atomless distribution, we can easily
write down bidder I’s pure strategies. A pure strategy for bidder I in the first
period is given by a function β1 which maps the set of first period signals into
a decision space {B, N} where B represents that he bids in the first period,
and N represents that he does not bid in the first period. In case of bidding
9 According to the paper by Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1981), assuming atomless
distributions does not have qualitative effect on the equilibrium.
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in the first period, bidder I has to participate in such a manner that bidder U
earns zero profit if he wins. Bidder I’s bidding strategies in the first period are
summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Suppose bidder I bids in the first round, in equilibrium, he bids
β1(v1) = Ev1+E2 when Ev1+E2 > r , and bids β1(v1) = r when Ev1+E2 ≤ r.
Proof. The proof is essentially the same as the one in the one shot game.
By bidding b ∈ (r,E1 + E2] in the first period, bidder U’s payoff if he wins is
E(V |β1(V1) < b)−b. Since β−11 (b) is strictly increasing in b ∈ (r,E1+E2], there
is a unique v1 such that v1 = β
−1
1 (b). Thus,
E(V |β1(V1) < b)− b = E(V |V1 < β−11 (b))− b
= E(V1|V1 < β−11 (b)) +E(V2|V2 < v2)− b
= Eβ−11 (b)
+E2 − b
By lemma 1, E(V |β1(V1) < b)− b = 0. Then we have
Eβ−11 (b)
+E2 − b = 0⇔ β1(β−11 (b)) = b = Eβ−11 (b) +E2
Substituting β−11 (b) with v1 yields β1(v1) = Ev1 + E2. Thus, we have
β1(v1) = Ev1 + E2 when Ev1 + E2 > r . Since β1(v1) is nondecreasing in
v1, it follows that β1(v1) = r when Ev1 +E2 ≤ r .
Let BI and BU denote the support of bids for bidder I and U in the first
period. Bidder U’s bidding strategies in the first period are summarized in the
following lemma.
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Lemma 3 Suppose bidder U bids in the first period, in equilibrium, BI ⊇ BU .
When he bids above r, he follows the same bidding distribution as what bidder I
follows, which is F1(v1).
The rationale is same as the one in the one period game. In order to induce
the above mentioned bidder I’s strategies, bidder U has to choose a bidding
distribution such that bidder I bids as if he is bidding against someone who is
just like him.
Suppose that both bidders did not bid in the first period and the auction
moves to the second period. Given that there is no future period, the auction
turns into a one period game. Since the outcome of the first period contains
information, after the first period bidder U updates his prior on the basis of no
bidding from bidder I in the first period. Therefore, the equilibrium strategies
differ from those in the described one period game in that both bidders follow
the distribution of the value of the object conditional on that bidder I did not
bid in the first period. Let F˜ (v), defined on the support [vL, vH ] ⊆ [0, v], be
the probability distribution that updates the prior F (v) after bidder U knowing
bidder I did not bid in the first period.10 Bidders’ bidding behaviors in the
second period are given in the following lemma.
Lemma 4 Suppose the auction moves to the second period, bidders’ bidding
strategies follow those in the described one period game, except that their bids
10 In the scenario where the seller commits to disclosing v2, v2 in a sense becomes
public information. Thus, bidders’ updated prior is not only based on no-
bidding in the first period but also based on v2, and it is formed such that
f˜(v) = f˜(v|f2(v2)).
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follow the bidding distribution F˜ (v).
Lemma 4 implies that the information conveyed from the first period affects
bidder’s bidding behavior only through the bidding distribution. This is because
bidder U remains to be less informed than bidder I and the updated beliefs
incorporate all the information available to him.
3.2.1 Scenario I: The seller commits to not disclosing v2
Given a reserve price and the first period signal v1, bidder I decides whether
or not to bid in the first period. Let pi1(v1) be the expected payoff if he bids
in the first period and pi2(v1) be the expected payoff if he waits till the second
period. Knowing bidders’ bidding behaviors described above, we have
Lemma 5 pi1(v1) is increasing in v1.
Proof. By lemma 2 and 3, pi1(v1) is either
(v1 −Ev1)F1(v1) (2)
if Ev1 +E2 > r or
(v1 +E2 − r)(γ + p
2
) (3)
if Ev1 + E2 ≤ r and v1 ≥ r − E2 where γ and p denote bidder U’s probability
of not bidding and bidding r. It can be shown easily that both (2) and (3) are
increasing in v1.
Lemma 6 pi2(v1) is increasing in v1.
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Proof. By lemma 4, pi2(v1) is written as
γ
∫ max(v2, r−v1)
max(0, r−v1)
(v − β2(v))F˜ (v)dF2(v2) (4)
The expression (4) is the expected payoff in the described one-shot game with
F˜ (v) as bidder U’s belief, weighted by the probability that bidder U does not
bid in the first period. An increase in v1 represents a higher value on v. Since
F˜ (v) is a updated prior of F (v) and the expected payoff in a one shot game
(v − β2(v))F (v) is increasing in v, it must be case that (v − β2(v))F˜ (v) is
increasing in v1 as well. Then, it follows immediately that pi2(v1) is increasing
in v1.
In this scenario, bidder I receives v2 in the second period and bidder U does
not observe any information in either period. When the auction moves to the
second period, bidders update their priors based on no-bidding in the first period
and also the c.d.f. F2(v2). As a consequence, the updated prior F˜ (v) has less
weight on higher values of v1. Further, both pi1(v1) and pi2(v1) are increasing
functions of v1. Therefore, on average, pi1(v1) increases more than pi2(v1) as v1
increases. Therefore, it is natural to look for equilibria in which bidder I bids
in the first period when v1 is high and waits till the second period when v1 is
low. The intuition is that the updated prior dampens the effect of v1 on bidder
I’s expected payoff. Since bidder I’s expected payoff is an increasing fuction of
the first period signal, it must generate more profit to bidder I if he bids in the
first period when he receives a high first period signal.
Let
V ∗1 = {v∗1 ∈ [0, v1] : pi1(v∗1) = pi2(v∗1)}
19
be the set of threshold values at which bidder I is indifferent between bidding
and waiting, given the belief that above which bidder I bids in the first round
and below which bidder I waits. If for all v1 ∈ [0, v1], pi1(v1) > pi2(v1), then
v∗1 = 0. If for all v1 ∈ [0, v1], pi1(v1) < pi2(v1), then v∗1 = v1. In equilibrium,
we have
Proposition 1 1. when r ∈ [0, E2], v∗1 = 0;
2. when r ∈ (E2,E1 +E2), v∗1 satifies E(V1|V1 < v∗1) +E(V2|V2 < v2) = r;
3. when r ∈ [E1 +E2, v1 + v2], v∗1 = v1.
The key feature in this two period game is the trade-off between bidding
immediately and waiting for additional information by the informed bidder. By
bidding immediately, bidder I enhances the probability of winning the object
but risks misinterpreting the value of the object. When the reserve price is lower
than the expected value of the second period signal, the advantage of obtaining
the object is more important than the advantage of knowing the value of the
object for certain and bidder I will always bid in the first round. When the
reserve price is higher than the expected value of object, bidder U will never
bid because of the potential for a negative payoff. Obviously, the advantage of
waiting for more information dominates over the advantage of bidding in the first
period for bidder I, thus in this case bidder I will always wait. When the reserve
price is moderate, the dominant advantage depends on the signal received in
the first period. As the value of the first period signal increases, waiting for
subsequent information becomes more costly and the benefit of obtaining the
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object becomes more important. So bidder I bids when the signal is high and
waits when the signal is low.
Given that bidder U bids randomly in the first period, his bidding behavior
is represented by a bidding distribution. In equilibrium, we have
Proposition 2 Bidder U’s bidding distribution in the first period is define by
H1(b) =


γ b < r
γ + p b = r
F1(β
−1
1 (b)) b > r
where γ and p satisfies the following linear equations
γ + p = F1(v
∗
1)
(γ + p2 )(v
∗
1 +E2 − r) = γ
∫max(v2, r−v∗1 )
max(0, r−v∗1)
(v∗1 + v2 − r)dF2(v2).
The left hand side of the second equation is bidder I’s expected payoff at v∗1
if he bids in the first period.11 The right hand side of the second equation is
bidder I’s expected payoff at v∗1 if he waits till the second period. The solution
to this two period problem has the feature that bidder I decides to bid (wait)
whenever the first period signal exceeds (is lower than) v∗1 . When the first
period signal is equal to v∗1 , he is indifferent between bidding and waiting. The
characterization of bidders’ equlibrium strategies in this two period game is
summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 3 The Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the two period game is:
At t = 1, bidder I bids Ev1 + E2 if v1 ∈ [v∗1 , v1] and does not bid otherwise;
11 Assume each bidder gets the object with the probability equal to 12 when there
is a tie at the reserve price.
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bidder U randomizes his decision on the support
BU =


[E2, E1 +E2] when r ∈ [0, E2]
{0} ∪ [r,E1 +E2] when r ∈ (E2, v1 + v2]
according to the c.d.f. H1(b). At t = 2, bidder I bids r whenever v > r and does
not bid otherwise; bidder U does not bid at all.
Theorem 3 extends the results of an asymmetric information game to a
dynamic setting. It states that bidder I depends on the values of both the
reserve price and the first period signal to decide whether to bid or to wait
until the second period, while bidder U randomizes his bid if he bids in the first
round and never bids in the second round. The results imply that when the
reserve price is low, both bidder bid in the first period and the object is sold
with certainty. This is now possible, because unlike the previously described
one period game, bidder I’s expected value of the object is always larger than
the reserve price, thus the reserve price no long serves as a binding constraint.
The fact that bidder U never bids in the second round in this scenario is because
bidder I waits till the second round when v1 < v
∗
1 . When r ∈ (E2, E1 + E2) or
r ∈ [E1+E2, v1+ v2], it follows that, if the auction moves to the second round,
the expected value of the object is no larger than the reserve price. Therefore,
according to Theorem 2, bidder U will not bid. The intuition is that bidder U
does not have anything to gain by waiting till the second period. So he either
bids in the first round or does not bid.
In OCS oil and gas lease auctions, the federal government will reject the high
bid if the bid is considered to be too low. Hendrick et al. (1988) report that the
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government regularly rejects winning bids and reoffers it in the future. Their
statistics show that the bids received on reoffered leases are generally lower than
those sold in previous offerings. This is consistent with my result that when the
auction goes to the second period the only bid received is the reserve price,
whereas the winning bid can be anything between the reserve price and the
expected value of the object if the auction ends in the first round.
3.2.2 Scenario II: The seller commits to disclosing v2 at the second
period.
Similar to scenario I, I investigate the equilibrium strategies in which the in-
formed bidder bids in the first round if the signal is high and waits till the
second round if the signal is low.
Let
V ∗∗1 = {v∗∗1 ∈ [0, v1] : pi1(v∗∗1 ) = pi2(v∗∗1 )}
be the set of threshold values at which bidder I is indifferent between bidding
and waiting, given the belief that above which bidder I bids in the first round
and below which bidder I waits. If for all v1 ∈ [0, v1], pi1(v1) > pi2(v1), then
v∗∗1 = 0. If for all v1 ∈ [0, v1], pi1(v1) < pi2(v1), then v∗∗1 = v1. In equilibrium,
we have
Proposition 3 1. when r ∈ [0, E2], v∗∗1 = 0;
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2. when r ∈ (E2,E1 +E2), v∗∗1 satifies
v∗∗1 +E2−r =
∫ min[r−Ev∗∗
1
,v2]
max[r−v∗∗1 ,0]
(v∗∗1 +v2−r)dF2(v2)+
∫ v2
min[r−Ev∗∗1
,v2]
(v∗∗1 −Ev∗∗1 )dF2(v2);
(5)
and v∗∗1 < v
∗
1 .
3. when r ∈ [E1 +E2, v1 + v2], v∗∗1 also satisfies (5). In case that
v1+E2−r <
∫ min[r−Ev∗∗1 ,v2]
max[r−v1,0]
(v1+v2−r)dF2(v2)+
∫ v2
min[r−Ev∗∗
1
,v2]
(v1−Ev1)dF2(v2)
for all v1 ∈ [0, v1], then v∗∗1 = v1.
In this scenario, I also distinguish three cases for bidders’ equilibrium strate-
gies. When the reserve price is lower than E2, bidder I always bid in the first
round and the object is always sold. Since the settings in both scenarios differ
only in the second round, the bidding strategies must be the same if the auction
ends in the first round. Therefore, the equilibrium strategies are indeed identi-
cal in both scenarios when r < E2. However, this is no longer the case when the
reserve price is higher than E2. As shown in case 2 and 3, the threshold value
v∗∗1 may be lower than v
∗
1 , the one in scenario I, which implies that, as compared
to scenario I, bidder I bids more frequently in the first period. The intuition is
that disclosure of the second period information induces the uninformed bidder
to bid in the second round, thus it triggers a competition in the second round.
The competition elicits aggressive bids from the informed bidder which in turn
decreases the rents he can extract in the second period. Therefore, the informed
bidder tends to bid more frequently in the first round and waits less.
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In this scenario, since bidder U observes v2 in the second period, v2 becomes a
public information. Hence, the information settings in two periods are similar in
the sense that v1 is the only private information bidder I has which bidder U does
not have. When the auction moves to the second period, bidder U updates his
prior based on no-bidding in the first period. Consequently, bidder U’s bidding
distribution is given by a conditional probability distribution, F1(β
−1
2 (b)|V1 <
v∗∗1 ). The equilibrium strategies in the second period are summarized in the
following theorem.
Theorem 4 For any Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium at t = 2, there exists a
threshold value v˜1 ∈ [0, v∗∗1 ] above which bidder I bids Ev1+v2, below which bidder
I either bids r or does not bid. If the value of v2 is high enough, bidder U may bid
in the second period and his bids follow the c.d.f. H2(b) = F1(β
−1
2 (b)|V1 < v∗∗1 )
whenever b > r.
Theorem 4 shows the equilibrium strategies in the second round for the sce-
nario when the seller commits to disclosing v2. The bidding strategies resemble
the equilibrium outcome presented in the described one period game, that is,
bidder I bids monotonically based on the values of signal v1 and v2, and bidder
U randomizes his bid whenever he participates. The major difference between
two scenarios is that bidder U may bid in the second period if v2 is high enough,
whereas he never participates in the second round in scenario I. This is because
bidder U can gain information by waiting in this scenario whereas he has noth-
ing to gain by waiting in scenario I. As a consequence, we may expect bidding
from both bidders in the second round.
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The important consequence of Theorem 4 is that, as I will show later, mak-
ing the second period information public decreases information asymmetries be-
tween two bidders in the second round, thus inducing competition which in turn
decreases the rents the informed bidder can extract and increases the seller’s
revenue.
Proposition 4 Bidder U’s bidding distribution in the first period is given by
H1(b) =


F1(v
∗
1) b ≤ r
F1(β
−1
1 (b)) b > r
Theorem 5 The Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium at t = 1 is: Bidder I bids
β1(v1) =


Ev1 +E2 when v1 ∈ [v∗1 , v1]
r when v1 ∈ [v∗∗1 , v∗1 ]
0 otherwise.
Bidder U randomizes his decision on the support
BU =


[E2, E1 +E2] when r ∈ [0, E2]
{0} ∪ (r,E1 +E2] when r ∈ (E2, v1 + v2]
according to the c.d.f. H1(b).
Proposition 4 and Theorem 5 present the equilibrium strategies in the first
period when the seller commits to disclose v2 in the second round. Similar to
Theorem 3, bidder I bids when the value of the signal is high and waits when
the value of the signal is low, while bidder U randmizes his decision on whether
to bid and how much to bid. Together with Proposition 3, Theorem 5 suggests
that, when r ∈ (E2, E1 + E2)12, bidder I possesses a mass point at the reserve
12This is the situation when v∗∗
1
= v∗
1
.
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price. This is exactly opposite to the results in scenario I, in which bidder
U possesses a mass point at the reserve price when r ∈ (E2, E1 + E2). The
rationale behind this is discussed in the following section.
3.2.3 Equilibrium Strategy Comparisons
In this section, I focus on the differences and similarities of the equilibrium
strategies in scenario I and II. In the table below, I show the probability of
bidding when r ∈ (E2,E1 + E2) for bidder i ∈ (I,U) and scenario j ∈ (N,D)
where N and D represent scenario I and scenario II respectively.
I U
N 1− F1(v∗1) 1− F1(v∗1) + p
D 1− F1(v∗∗1 ) 1− F1(v∗1)
Let pji denote the probability of bidding in the first period when r ∈ (E2, E1+E2)
for bidder i and scenario j. One then has the following:
Lemma 7 Since v∗∗1 ≤ v∗1, we have
1. pNI < p
N
U , p
D
I > p
D
U ;
2. pNI < p
D
I , p
N
U > p
D
U .
The results from the comparisons are summarized as follows: First, bidder
I bids more frequently than bidder U in the first round whereas the situation is
exactly opposite in the first scenario. Second, compared with the first scenario,
the likelihood of bidding in the first round is higher for bidder I but lower for
bidder U in the second scenario.
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The equilibrium differences between two scenarios imply two distinct effects
of allowing the seller to commit to disclosing v2, the ‘frequent bidding effect’
and the ‘immediate bidding effect.’ The frequent bidding effect measures bidder
I’s probability of bidding in the first round versus bidder U’s probability of
bidding in the first round, and it is shown by the first two inequalities. The
frequent bidding effect favors bidder I in the sense that bidding in the first round
becomes more attractive for bidder I but less attractive for bidder U when
the seller commits to disclosing v2, thus bidder I bids more frequently than
bidder U in the first round. The immediate bidding effect measures bidders’
probabilities of bidding immediately versus their probabilities of waiting, and it
is shown by the second two inequalities. Since bidder I’s information advantage
is lessened in the second round when the seller commits to disclosing v2, he has
less incentive to wait thus tends to bid immediately. Conversely, since bidder
U can obtain information by waiting, he has more incentive to wait thus tends
not to bid immediately. In other words, committing to disclosing v2 decreases
the degree of information asymmetry so that, in contrast to the analysis in the
first scenario, waiting may become beneficial for the uninformed bidder but not
for the informed one.
Corollary 1 In both scenarios, when r ∈ [0, E2], bidders’ strategies are exactly
the same; when r ∈ (E2, E1 + E2), bidder U may bid in the first period while
bidder I does not.
When the reserve price is lower than E2, both bidders bid in the first round
and the object is always sold. Since the settings in both scenarios differ only in
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the second round, the bidding strategies must be the same if the auction ends in
the first round. Indeed, the equilibrium strategies are identical in both scenarios
when r < E2. When r ∈ (E2, E1 +E2), in both scenarios, bidder I follows the
strategy of bidding when the signal is high and waiting when the signal is low,
while bidder U randomizes his decision on whether to bid and how much to bid.
This establishes an interesting situation where we may observe bidding from
the uninformed bidder instead of the informed one in the first around. In fact,
this phenomenon is observed in many economic environments. For example, we
often observe situations of entering into a new product market by a new firm
instead of an incumbent. The firm which enters into the market later has to
bear the possibility of being the follower and earning a smaller market share,
but gains more accurate information on the new market. This result provides an
understanding for why such situations exist, and suggest when we may observe
it as well.
4 Seller’s Revenue Analysis
The issue addressed in this section is whether the seller, in order to maximize
the ex ante expected revenue, should commit to disclosing the second period
information when he chooses freely the reserve price. In order to simplify the
analysis, I assume both signals follow a uniform distribution in [0, 1].13 I first
13 The results would be the same if both signals follow a uniform distribution
in [a, b] since the normalization of the signals only has quantitative effect on
bidders’ payoff.
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compare the revenue in two scenarios and show that the seller weakly prefers
to commit to disclosing the second period information. Then I turn to the
optimal reserve price and show that, at low reserve prices, the seller maximizes
the expected revenue by setting the reserve price lower than the expected value
of the second signal in both scenario. Furthermore, I analyze how results are
affected if the seller can commit to sell the object only in one period. Our
main result is that committing to selling the object in only one period does
not change the maximized ex ante expected revenue received in the two period
game and the optimal reserve prices remain to be low as well. This provides
an implication that the feature of selling the object more than once does not
reduce the seller’s expected revenue at all.14
4.1 Revenue analysis in a two Period Game
I first discuss the ex ante probabilities of trade. My object is to compare
the ex ante probability of trade when the seller commits to not disclosing the
second period information, p1, with the ex ante probability of trade when the
seller commits to disclosing the second period information, p2. Under my
assumption of signals following a uniform distribution in [0, 1], the threshold
value for bidder I in the first scenario, v∗1 , is 2r − 1 and the threshold value for
14 Wang (1993) obtained the opposite result in terms of the seller’s ability to sell
on more than one occasion. He shows that if the seller can somehow commit
himself to selling in the first period, he will receive more revenue.
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Figure 1: Reserve prices and probabilities of trade
bidder I in the second scenario, v∗∗1 , is
2(2r−1)
3 . One then has:
p1 =


1 when r ∈ [0, 12 ]
(2− 2r) + (2− 2r + p)(2r − 1) + γ ∫ v∗10 ∫ 1min(r−v1,1) dv2dv1 when r ∈ ( 12 , 1)∫ 1
0
∫ 1
min(1,r−v1)
dv2dv1 when r ∈ [1, 2]
p2 =


1 when r ∈ [0, 12 ]
(2− 2r) + (1− v∗∗1 )(2r − 1) + (2r − 1)v∗∗1 B when r ∈ (12 , 1)
(1− v∗∗1 ) + v∗∗1 B when r ∈ [1, 2]
where B =
∫ min(r,1)
min(1,r−
v∗∗1
2
)
(1− r − v2
v∗∗1
2r − 2v2
v∗∗1
)dv2 +
∫ 1
min(1,r)
dv2 +
∫ min(1,r− v∗∗1
2
)
min(1,r−v∗∗1 )
(1− r − v2
v∗∗1
)dv2
After comparing p1 with p2, one has the following result.
Proposition 5 When the seller has access to v2, the probability of trade is
never decreased by committing to disclosing v2. For r ∈ [12 , 32 ], p2 > p1.
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In Figure 1, the solid line represents the first scenario where the seller com-
mits to not disclosing v2 and the dashed one represents the second scenario
where the seller commits to disclosing v2. One sees that for r ∈ [0, 12 ] and
r ∈ [32 , 2] the seller is indifferent between committing to disclosure or commit-
ting to nondisclosure, while for r ∈ [12 , 32 ], the seller strictly prefers to commit
to disclosing v2. For r ∈ [0, 12 ], bidding behaviors are identical in both scenarios,
thus the corresponding probabilities of trade are the same as well. For r ∈ [32 , 2],
in both scenarios, bidder U declines to bid since the expected value of the object
to bidder U can never be above 32 before or after v2 is disclosed. Bidder I then
faces a “take it or leave it” situation and two scenarios become the same as
well. For r ∈ [12 , 32 ], committing to disclosing v2 increases the amount of trade
compared to the case when the sller coommits to not disclosing v2, by triggering
the competition in the second period. Disclosing the second period information
provides bidder U incentive to participate in the second period, thus the object
can be sold to both bidders.
Figure 1 also reflects that in equilibrium, the probability of trade is a de-
creasing function of the reserve price in both scenarios. It is strictly decreasing
over the reserve price starting at 12 and the decreasing rate is increasing for
r ∈ (12 , 1) and decreasing for r ∈ [1, 2]. This result provides a key technical tool
to analyze the change of the seller’s revenue corresponding to the reserve price.
I now turn to the discussion of the seller’s ex ante revenue. To compare the
ex ante revenue in the case of committing to not disclosing the second period
information, R1, with the ex ante revenue in the case of committing to disclosing
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the second period information, R2, I have the following:
R1 =


2
∫ 1
0
1+v1
2 v1dv1 =
5
6 when r ∈ [0, 12 ]
2
∫ 1
v∗1
1+v1
2 v1dv1 + r(2r − 1)p+ γ
∫ v∗1
0
∫ 1
min(r−v1,1)
rdv2dv1 when r ∈ ( 12 , 1)∫ 1
0
∫ 1
min(1,r−v1)
rdv2dv1 when r ∈ [1, 2]
R2 =


2
∫ 1
0
1+v1
2 v1dv1 =
5
6 when r ∈ [0, 12 ]
2
∫ 1
2r−1
1+v1
2 v1dv1 + r(2r − 1)
∫ 2r−1
v∗∗1
dv1 + (2r − 1)
∫ v∗∗1
0
Adv1 when r ∈ (12 , 1)∫ 1
v∗∗1
rdv1 +
∫ v∗∗1
0 Adv1 when r ∈ [1, 2]
where A = 2
∫ 1
min(1,r−
v∗∗
1
2
)
1 + v1
2
v1
v∗∗1
dv2 +
∫ min(1,r− v12 )
min(1,max(r−
v∗∗
1
2 ,r−v1))
r
2r − 2v2
v∗∗1
dv2 +
∫ min(1,max(r− v∗∗12 ,r−v1))
min(r−v1,1)
rdv2
After comparing R1 with R2, one has the following result.
Proposition 6 When the seller has access to v2, he weakly prefers to commit
to disclosing v2. For r ∈ [12 , 32 ], the seller strictly prefers to commit to disclosing
v2.
Like in Figure 1, the solid line represents the first scenario where the seller
commits to not disclosing v2 and the dashed one represents the second scenario
where the seller commits to disclosing v2. The logic follows closely the one for
the probability of trade, and the intuition is based on ‘Linkage Principle’ by
Milgrom and Weber (1982) which states that a seller always benefits from dis-
closing information that is affiliated to the value of the object. When the reserve
price is moderate, publicizing the second period information in a sense favors
the uninformed bidder by reducing information asymmtries between them. It
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Figure 2: Reserve prices and seller’s expected revenue
elicits bidding from the uninformed bidder, thus avoids the loss due to lack of
competition in the second round. As a result, the informed bidder fails to fully
exploit his information advantage and bids more aggressively, which implies a
lower expected profit to the informed bidder but a higher return to the seller.
Note that the seller’s expected revenue in the first scenario is not differentiable
at r = 1. This is explained by the fact that when bidder U does not participate
in the auction the seller’s revenue is expressed by a different function.
Similar to the change of the probabilities of trade, the ex ante expected
revenue is also a decreasing function of the reserve price in both scenarios.
Hence, one has the following result:
Proposition 7 In both scenario, the seller maximizes the ex ante expected rev-
enue by setting r ∈ [0, 12 ].
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When r ∈ [0, 12 ], both bidders always bid in the first round and the object
is always sold. When the reserve price is above 12 , the object may not be sold
and any increase in the reserve price lowers the probability that bidders place
a bid. Although a higher payment occurs from an increase in the reserve
price, the gain from a higher payment is always smaller than the loss from a
lower probability of trade. After all, any increase in the reserve price results in
a decrease in the seller’s revenue. Intuitively, since the informed bidder is the
only one which has the private information, setting low reserve prices encourages
both bidders to bid in the first period, thus this decreases the informed bidder’s
information advantage by negating his gaining more information in the second
period. Consequently, it lowers the informed bidder’s expected profit and raises
the seller’s expected revenue.
The result implies that, at a optimal reserve price, the auction ends in the
first period. One may wonder that to what extent the results would change
if the seller can commit to selling the object in only one period. In the next
section, I investigate the situations where the object is sold either in the first or
second round and compare the seller’s ex ante revenue under different cases.
4.2 Revenue analysis in a one period game
It is assumed that the seller sets the reserve price before he observes any in-
formation. In the following graphs (the expressions for the seller’s revenue are
provided in the appendix), case (i) is the situation when the object is sold in the
first period; case (ii) is the situation when the object is sold in the second period
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Figure 3: One period game revenue comparison
and the seller commits to not disclosing v2; case (iii) is the situation when the
object is sold in the second period and the seller commits to disclosing v2. The
findings are summarized as follows.
Proposition 8 When the seller has the option to conduct the auction in only
one period, he will either sell the object in the first period and set r ∈ [0, 12 ],
or sell the object in the second period with zero reserve price and commit to
disclosing the second period. In both cases, the ex ante revenue is maximized,
and the maximized ex ante revenue is the same as the one in the two period
game, which is equal to 56 .
In case (i), the reasoning about the seller’s revenue remains unchanged from
the two period game. For r ∈ [0, 12), both bidders always participate and their
bids are always above the reserve price. Thus, the seller’s expected revenue is
the same as in the two period game and it is equal to 56 . For r ∈ [12 , 32 ], the
36
seller’s revenue changes with the payment and the probability of bidding. As
the reserve price goes up, the payment goes up, yet the probability of bidding
goes down. Again, the seller does not benefit from the increase of the reserve
price, since the probability of bidding goes down at a more rapid rate. In case
(iii), the expected revenue is calculated before v2 is observed by the seller, and
is shown as decreasing over the reserve price. The reason is essentially the same
as in case (i) when r ∈ [12 , 32 ]. Although the availability of v2 in case (iii)
affects the ends of the bidding support, the shape of the bidding distribution
remains the same as in case (i) since v1 is the only private information bidder
I has which bidder U does not have in both cases. Consequently, the seller’s
revenue is maximized at r = 0 in both case (i) and (iii), and their maximized
ex ante revenue is 56 which is the same as the one in the two period game. In
contrast, in case (ii) the private information bidder I has includes both v1 and
v2. Consequently, the bidding distribution becomes concentrated in the middle.
This indeed changes the trade-off faced by the seller as the reserve price goes up.
As a result, the expected revenue is maximized at r = 0.65 and the maximized
revenue is lower than 56 .
When comparing these three cases, I also observe that for the reserve prices
between 12 and 1, the expected revenue in case (i) changes at a more rapid rate
than in both case (ii) and (iii). This is due to the fact that an increase in
the reserve price is more effective in reducing the expected revenue in the first
period. In the first period, a higher reserve price leads to a reduction in the
probability of bidding immediately. While in the second period the probability
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of bidding is affected not only by an increase of the reserve price, but also
by the value of v2. Therefore, the effect of the reserve price is dampened by
the presence of v2. In other words, the reserve price becomes less effective in
decreasing the probability of bidding in the second period, thus the decrease of
the probability only partially reflects the increase of the reserve price.
An important implication from this result is that committing to selling the
object in only one period does not change the surplus generated to the seller,
since seller’s optimal strategy is indeed to sell in the first period even with the
ability to sell on more occasions. This result provides an explanation to why
the U.S. government has been setting the reserve prices substantially low and
maintaining the reoffering feature in OCS auctions.15
Proposition 9 Let RI , RNII and R
D
II be the expected revenue for case (i), (ii)
and (iii). Then, we have
1. RNII ≤ RDII for all r ∈ [0, 2].
2. RI ≥ RNII for r ∈ [0, 1] and RI < RNII for r ∈ (1, 2].
3. RI ≥ RDII for r ∈ [0, 0.8] and RI < RNII for r ∈ (0.8, 2].
The proposition shows that, as expected, if the object is sold only in the sec-
ond period, the seller is never worse off by making the second period information
public. The intuition follows from the linkage principle by Milgrom and Weber
(1982), which states that a seller always benefits from disclosing information
15 McAfee and Vincent (1992) considers a one-period common-value model and
shows that the U.S. government has been setting the reserve price substantially
lower than the optimal reserve prices in OCS auctions.
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that is affiliated to the value of the object. When comparing RI with RNII ,
at first glance, it seems that RI should always be higher. Since the informed
bidder is better informed about the object’s value in case (ii), the uninformed
bidder is more vulnerable (than in case (i)) to the winner’s curse (winning be-
cause the informed bidder holds a lower estimated value of the object), and as
a result he shades his bid even more in case (ii). After all, we may expect a
higher expected profit for the informed bidder and a smaller RNII . However,
this is only true when the reserve price is lower than the expected value of the
object which is one. The reason is that there exists another effect. In case
(i), the informed bidder is uncertain about the value of the object because he
is only partly informed, and this uncertainty becomes intensified as the reserve
price goes up. Thus, when the reserve price is higher than the expected value
of the object, this ‘uncertainty effect’ induces the informed bidder to bid more
cautiously. As a consequence, the informed bidder bids less often in case (i)
than in case (ii) which in turn leads to a lower RI . Indeed, the similar rationale
carries over to the revenue comparison between case (i) and case (iii). That is,
there also exists a threshold value below which RI is higher, above which R
D
II is
higher. Since RDII is higher than R
N
II , the threshold value here is less than the
threshold value between case (i) and case (ii). In general, as the the reserve
price increases, selling the object only in the second period is more likely to
benefit the seller.
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5 Conclusion
This paper explores bidders’ incentives to wait in a first price, sealed bid auc-
tion where one bidder has private information in two consecutive periods and
the other has only public information. The problem is examined in two sit-
uations when the seller has access to the second period information received
by the informed bidder: he either commits to not disclosing the second period
information or commits to disclosing it. I have shown that the informed bidder
waits more frequently in the first situation while the uninformed one does the
exact opposite. The rationale is: Publicizing the second period information
diminishes the informed bidder’s information advantage in the second round,
while providing the uninformed bidder incentive to wait.
I have shown that in both situations, the ex ante revenue is maximized
by setting low reserve prices. The intuition is: Since the informed bidder is
better informed in the second round, waiting decreases uncertainty so that the
informed bidder takes less risk than bidding in the first round, thus he benefits
most from waiting. Consequently, the seller prefers immediate bidding, thus
he sets low reserve prices. Moreover, I study the situation when the seller has
the option to sell the object in only one period. I find that if the auction
is conducted in the first round, setting low reserve prices is optimal for the
seller. If, on the other hand, the auction is conducted in the second round,
then setting zero reserve price and committing to disclosing the second period
information generates most surplus to the seller. Nevertheless, the maximized
ex ante revenue of the one period game is the same as the one in the two period
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game.
My findings suggest an explanation for why in practices we may observe
bidding from a uninformed bidder instead of an informed one. They also provide
insights on how the government should manipulate the information possessed by
the firms to affect the chances of their participation and the amount of revenue
generated in OCS auctions.
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Chapter II
Epidemic Outbreak and Information Disclosure
1 Introduction
Currently, one of the greatest concerns worldwide is that governments should
be better equipped in order to deal with a potential outbreak of SARS, bird
flu, or other virulent diseases. This paper addresses an urgent, yet unstudied
problem from the aspect of information disclosure in dealing with a potential
epidemic: what is the optimal information disclosing policy in the presence of
an outbreak?
During this situation, the government wants the public to take precautionary
actions to avoid the disease. At the same time, the government knows that such
precautionary actions often have negative effects. For instance, the SARS crisis
in April of 2003 created panic in many Chinese communities. In Beijing, many
residents remained indoors with hopes of evading the disease, yet others fled in
a fearful rush. The city’s railway stations bustled with frantic citizens clad in
facemasks pushing and shoving, trying to purchase tickets out of town.16 Soon
after, the government forbade individuals from entering or exiting Beijing. In
this example, citizens panicked when apprised of the facts and tried to flee. The
cost of revealing the danger of disease emerges from the fact that individuals
acted in response to the danger in an inappropriate manner.
Considering the above scenario, how should governments deal with a problem
like SARS? Is it possible to disclose “too much” information? In the presence
of such “panic cost,” the ultimate goal for the government is to find a way to
encourage precautionary actions to a certain extent which maximize the social
16“How bad is it?”, TimeAsia, April 28, 2003
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welfare. This paper examines both the positive and the negative effects of
disclosure upon citizens and investigates various situations where disclosure or
non-disclosure policy should be implemented. The basic idea is that: depending
on the function forms of both positive externality and negative externality, the
benefit of disclosure in case of a less severe state can be smaller or larger than
the cost of disclosure in case of a more severe state. I show that disclosure
is likely to be less desirable when, at a certain level of precautionary actions,
costs from panic increase dramatically or the precautionary action taken by the
public hardly improves the danger of the epidemic’s center. On the other hand,
if costs from panic increase at a decreasing rate and the precautionary action
decreases the probability of becoming infected at an increasing rate, it is always
desirable for the government to disclose everything. The results also indicate
that if the possible transmission rates of a disease are sufficiently small, the
disclosure policy is also desirable.
We may apply the results to many situations apart from epidemic outbreaks,
such as natural disasters like hurricanes and earthquakes, or security emergen-
cies like the threat of terrorism. In all such cases, information disclosure can
trigger people’s precautionary actions while simultaneously creating panic. The
discussion of disclosure and nondisclosure conditions add to our understand-
ing of the effect of payoff externalities on optimal information disclosure polices
and provides insight for the government in tackling possible outbreaks and other
future disasters.
The paper makes these assumptions:
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1. Since the individuals who are infected are vulnerable and fleeing will prob-
ably add more disadvantages than advantages to their chance of survival,
I assume the infected will stay and the individuals who flee will not be
infected.
2. There is no private information in the model so public behavior is based
solely on the government’s announcements.
3. The timing covers only one period.
4. Social welfare, which is the sum of everyone’s payoff, is the only concern
to the government.
The paper performs a theoretical analysis which has not been done in either
epidemiology or information disclosure literature. A few related papers include
the vaccination market analysis by Francis (1997), and Bauch & Earn (2004).
Francis studies how and when externalities are involved in individual vaccina-
tion decisions. He developed both static and dynamic models. The results
show that the externalities are not necessarily associated with an individual’s
vaccination decision. Bauch & Earn analyze individuals’ vaccination decisions
based on their perceived vaccine risk. They show that after a vaccine panic, it
is difficult to recover the previous vaccine coverage levels even if the perceived
risk is decreased.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 dis-
cusses the behavior of the public after the government discloses the information.
Section 4 analyzes the government’s problems in order to maximize the total
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welfare. Section 5 characterizes the conditions for governments to fully reveal
the information and fully conceal the information. Section 6 uses examples to
analyze the effect of payoff externalities upon optimal disclosing policies and
derives the situation where the government is indifferent between revealing pol-
icy and concealing policy. Section 7 discusses applications of the model to other
situations. Section 8 summarizes the results.
2 Model
I develop a static, binary action, continuum player game where each player has
the same payoff function. The model is constructed to address the question of
how the government will disclose the news of an epidemic, like SARS, in a single
period. The set of states of nature that determine the severity of the disease is
Q = {1, ...,M}. The interpretation will be that states are numbered so that the
severity increases with the state.17 The initial beliefs of both the government
and the public are specified by a probability vector φ = {φ1, φ2, ..., φM}, where
each φm is positive and
M∑
m=1
φm = 1. There is a continuum of individuals. Each
individual has to choose an action between staying inside the city and running
away. I assume that individuals who run away are quarantined and will not be
infected after they run away from the city which has the epidemic outbreak. Let
a be the action taken by each individual. The action a = 1 when the individual
flees from the disease. The action a = 0 when he stays. I denote by l the
17 Since the government often does not know accurately how severe the disease is,
a severity level may represent a range of situations.
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proportion of individuals who choose to run away.
The paper will focus on the analysis of an ex ante policy. The government
commits to a policy before observing the state m. An ex ante policy is a set of
signals {S1, S2, S3, . . . , Sn} with properties of
Si ∩ Sj = φ for i = j;
S1 ∪ S2 ∪ ... ∪ Sn = Q; and
m ∈ Si(m)
and Si(m) is the signal chosen when the true state of nature is m. The an-
nouncement is truthful in the sense that there is no false information involved,
but depending on the number of the states contained, the signal can be very
vague. The reason for the commitment by the government is as follows: With-
out commitment, the government may not have any incentive to manipulate
information because the public is fully aware of the fact that the announcement
depends on the realized state. So the public will ignore any irrelevant informa-
tion and infer the true state. Thus, in equilibrium, it may be impossible for the
government to hide information. For example, let Q = {1, 2}. Suppose with the
updated belief the citizens will respond properly if the signal {1, 2} is reported
while if they knew the true state is 2, they would not. Also, suppose the cit-
izens would respond properly if they knew the true state is 1. Then, in order
to trigger appropriate precautionary actions, the government should report {1}
when the true state is 1, report {1, 2} when the true state is 2. However, this
could not be credible since when citizens receive report {1, 2} they realize the
true state is 2. Thus, the public will not be ‘tricked’ and respond as if {2} is
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reported when {1, 2} is announced. Similar reason follows for why overlapping
messages are excluded in the setup of the policy. Again, suppose the govern-
ment chooses S(1) = {1} and S(2) = {1, 2}. When {1, 2} is reported, the public
would not update their belief according to relative prior probabilities of states
1 and 2 because they can infer the true state is 2 immediately. Therefore, the
policy can not be credible either.
After the annoucement, the public processes the information in the signal
and chooses to run away or stay, which determines the overall payoff and social
welfare. The people’s payoff depends on the adopted action a, the state m and
the proportion of individuals who run away l and is given by a function
u(a, m, l) : {0, 1} × {1, ...,M} × [0, 1]→ .
Conditional on staying, the payoff is equal to 1 if an individual is not infected
and it is equal to 0 if said person is infected. I denote by ς(m, l) the probability
that an individual is going to be infected if she stays. I assume ς(m, l) increases
as m increases and l decreases in the sense that the more severe the disease and
the more the number of individuals who stay, the more likely she will be infected.
The rational for this is that the probability of getting infected is presumably
smaller if there are fewer individuals as media to transmit the disease. After the
public hears the announcement, they will update their belief about the state.
Let φ(m | Si) be the probability placed on the state m after the government
reports the signal Si. By Bayes’s rule, I have
φ(m | Si) = φm∑
m˜∈Si
φm˜
.
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The negative payoff externality from running away is represented by t(l) which
measures the difficulties experienced in running away and it strictly increases
as l increases. In reality, t(l) can be considered as the cost of panic such as the
shortage of necessities, the probability of crime or possible congestion and etc.
Therefore, the expected payoffs for the individuals who stay and leave are given
respectively as follows:
Eu(0, m, l) = 1− ς(m, l);
Eu(1, m, l) = 1− t(l) 0 ≤ t(l) ≤ 1.
The payoff difference between the two choices is represented by
pi(l, m) = Eu(0, m, l)−Eu(1, m, l) = t(l)− ς(m, l). (6)
Inspired by the epidemic model in Francis (1997), I assume ς(m, l) = f(m)v(l)
where f(m) is the transmission rate, which measures the probability that en-
countering an infected individual will result in a new infection and it is strictly
increasing in m, and v(l) is the chance of encountering an infected individual,
which is influenced by the rate of contact among individuals and it is strictly
decreasing in l. Multiplying the transmission rate, f(m), by the probability of
encountering an infected individual, v(l), gives the rate at which a susceptible
(uninfected) individual will be infected if he/she stays. The key feature of the
model is the two externalities triggered when individuals leave the city. When
more individuals leave, the individuals who stay have less chance of getting in-
fected, but the individuals who leave encounter higher difficulities of leaving.
Thus, the government faces the tradeoff between the concern of the safety of
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the epidemic center and the concern of controlling panic when the information
is disclosed. To start the analysis on how the government should tradeoff the
benefits and costs of revealing information, I begin with the discussion of the
relationship between the revealed information and the proportion of people who
leave in the next section.
3 The Public’s behavior
Let lˆ be the proportion of individuals who run away at equilibrium. When lˆ is
0, everyone stays. When lˆ is 1, everyone runs away. When lˆ is between 0 and
1, people are indifferent between staying and running away. Given the state m
and the government’s announcement Si, in order for the public to be indifferent
between running away and staying,
∑
m˜∈Si
pi(lˆ, m˜)φ(m˜ | Si) = 0. (7)
Substituting (6) into (7) yields
t(lˆ) =
∑
m˜∈Si
ς(m˜, lˆ)]
φm˜∑
m˜∈Si
φm˜
. (8)
After solving the preceding problem, lˆ is implicitly given by:
lˆ = t−1(
∑
m˜∈Si
ς(m˜, lˆ)φm˜∑
m˜∈Si
φm˜
). (9)
After plugging f(m)v(l) into (9), I have
t(lˆ)
v(lˆ)
=
∑
m˜∈Si
f(m˜)φm˜∑
m˜∈Si
φm˜
. (10)
It is assumed that both v(l) and t(l) are continuous and differentiable.
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Lemma 1 Given a signal Si, individuals will act according to the following:
1. They will all stay if t(0) >
∑
m˜∈Si
ς(m˜,0)φm˜∑
m˜∈Si
φm˜
.
2. They will all run away if t(1) <
∑
m˜∈Si
ς(m˜,1)φm˜∑
m˜∈Si
φm˜
.
3. A proportion of individuals will run away if t(0) <
∑
m˜∈Si
ς(m˜,0)φm˜∑
m˜∈Si
φm˜
and t(1) >
∑
m˜∈Si
ς(m˜,1)φm˜∑
m˜∈Si
φm˜
.
Proof. Given a signal Si, individuals will all stay if
∑
m˜∈Si
pi(0, m˜)φ(m˜ | Si) > 0
which implies ∑
m˜∈Si
[t(0)− ς(m˜, 0)] φm˜∑
m˜∈Si
φm˜
> 0 (11)
By solving (11), we have t(0) >
∑
m˜∈Si
ς(m˜,0)φm˜∑
m˜∈Si
φm˜
. The proof of the other two cases
follow the same logic.
Since the city is less safe to stay in and easier to run away from if less
people leave, people want to leave when there is a smaller proportion of peo-
ple leaving. As lˆ increases, the city becomes safer and leaving becomes more
inconvenient. Thus, there exists a threshold lˆ which makes leaving and stay-
ing equally attractive whenever the signal, Si, satisfies t(0) <
∑
m˜∈Si
ς(m˜,0)φm˜∑
m˜∈Si
φm˜
and
t(1) >
∑
m˜∈Si
ς(m˜,1)φm˜∑
m˜∈Si
φm˜
. However, if the difficulty of leaving is too large, which
is the case when t(0) >
∑
m˜∈Si
ς(m˜,0)φm˜∑
m˜∈Si
φm˜
, no people will leave because a positive lˆ
can only add more benefit to stay than to leave. So individuals will all stay. In
contrast, when the difficulty of leaving is so small, individuals will all run away.
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Given two nonempty signals, Si and Sj . For si ∈ Si and sj ∈ Sj , I define
the ‘lower subset’, S˜i(si) = {s˜i ∈ Si : s˜i ≤ si}, and the ‘upper subset’, S˜j(sj) =
{s˜j ∈ Sj : s˜j ≥ sj}.
Lemma 2 If there exists a pair of si and sj such that S˜i(si) and S˜j(sj) contain
an equal number of elements and s˜i(k) ≥ s˜j(k) where s˜i(k) and s˜j(k) are the kth
ranked elements in S˜i(si) and S˜j(sj), then we have lsi ≥ lsj .
The intuition of the result is very straightforward. It suggests that at equi-
librium there will be more people leaving the city if the signal implies a higher
level of severity of the disease. For example, given two signals from two differ-
ent policy profiles S1 = {1, 2, 3} and S2 = {2, 3, 4}, the proportion of people
who will be leaving after they receive S1 will be smaller than the proportion
of people who will be leaving after receiving S2 since S2 implies more people
are infected. Given two signals, we can compare their triggered proportion of
individuals who leave if and only if we can find a lower subset from one signal
and a higher subset from the other signal such that both subsets consist of equal
numbers of elements and the element with the same rank from the lower subset
is greater than or equal to the element with the same rank from the higher
subset. Otherwise, they are not comparable. An example for this is S1 = {2, 4}
and S2 = {1, 3, 4}. In such, we do not find subsets from each signal to satisfy
the conditions in Lemma 2, so we cannot compare between lˆ1and lˆ2 without
considering the prior probabilities φms.
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4 The Governments’ Problem
The government commits itself to a disclosure policy before the outbreak of a
disease has occured. Given the public’s behavior, the government must find the
optimal revelation policy in order to maximize the social welfare, which is the
sum of each individual’s payoff. The government’s objective function is:
max
{S1, S2, S3,...Sn}
EW =
∑
m∈Q
φm{lˆSiu(1, m, lˆSi) + (1− lˆSi)u(0, m, lˆSi)}
=
∑
m∈Q
φm[1− ς(m, lˆSi) + lˆSi(ς(m, lˆSi)− t(lˆSi))]
s.t. t(lˆSi) =
∑
m˜∈Si
ς(m˜, lˆSi)φm˜∑
m˜∈Si
φm˜
when t(0) ≤
∑
m˜∈Si
ς(m˜, 0)φm˜∑
m˜∈Si
φm˜
and t(1) ≥
∑
m˜∈Si
ς(m˜, 1)φm˜∑
m˜∈Si
φm˜
;
lˆSi = 0 when t(0) >
∑
m˜∈Si
ς(m˜, 0)φm˜∑
m˜∈Si
φm˜
and lˆSi = 1 when t(1) <
∑
m˜∈Si
ς(m˜, 1)φm˜∑
m˜∈Si
φm˜
;
and Si ∩ Sj = φ for i = j and S1 ∪ S2 ∪ ... ∪ Sn = Q and m ∈ Si(m).
After substituting ς(m, lˆSi) with f(m)v(lˆSi), we have the following:
max
{S1, S2, S3,...Sn}
1−
∑
m∈Q
φmt(li)
s.t.
t(lˆSi)
v(lˆSi)
=
∑
m˜∈Si
f(m˜)φm˜∑
m˜∈Si
φm˜
when
t(0)
v(0)
≤
∑
m˜∈Si
f(m˜)φm˜∑
m˜∈Si
φm˜
and
t(1)
v(1)
≥
∑
m˜∈Si
f(m˜)φm˜∑
m˜∈Si
φm˜
;
lˆSi = 0when
t(0)
v(0)
>
∑
m˜∈Si
f(m˜)φm˜∑
m˜∈Si
φm˜
and lˆSi = 1when
t(1)
v(1)
<
∑
m˜∈Si
f(m˜)φm˜∑
m˜∈Si
φm˜
;
and Si ∩ Sj = φ for i = j and S1 ∪ S2 ∪ ... ∪ Sn = Q and m ∈ Si(m).
In order to simplify the problem, I assume t(0)
v(0) ≤ f(1) and t(1)v(1) ≥ f(M).
The former inequality, which is equivalent to t(0) ≤ f(1)v(0), implies that it is
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always better for people to leave when nobody has left yet. The latter inequality,
which is equivalent to t(1) ≥ f(M)v(1) implies that it is always better for people
to stay when everyone has left. These two assumptions rule out situations where
t(0)
v(0)
>
∑
m˜∈Si
f(m˜)φm˜∑
m˜∈Si
φm˜
or
t(1)
v(1)
<
∑
m˜∈Si
f(m˜)φm˜∑
m˜∈Si
φm˜
.
Given a signal Si, let
xi =
∑
m˜∈Si
f(m˜)φm˜∑
m˜∈Si
φm˜
(12)
which represents the expected transmission rate implied by the signal Si and
g(l) =
t(l)
v(l)
. (13)
For x ∈ [f(1), f(M)], I define
w(x) = t(g−1(x)) (14)
The function w(x) is a tranformation of t(l) and measures the difficulties of
leaving given an expected transmission rate. At last, the government’s problem
transforms to
min
{S1, S2, S3,...Sn}
∑
m∈Q
φmw(xi) s.t. xi =
∑
m˜∈Si
f(m˜)φm˜∑
m˜∈Si
φm˜
(15)
and Si ∩ Sj = φ for i = j and S1 ∪ S2 ∪ ... ∪ Sn = Q and m ∈ Si(m)
According to (15), the government is to minimize the expected difficulties of
leaving by choosing appropriate disclosing policies. Given the set of all possible
severity levels, the government can choose a full disclosing policy which is to
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announce the true and accurate state which has occured. The policy profile
for a full disclosing policy is {{1}, {2}, ..., {M}}. Or they can choose a full con-
cealing policy which is to announce the signal which has all the states and is
described by the policy profile {1, 2, ...,M}. Or they can use partial disclosing
policies, such as {{1, 2}, {3}, {4}, ...{M}} or {{1, 2}, {3, 4}, ...{M}}. The diffi-
culty of comparing all possible policies is enhanced as the number of possible
states goes up because the number of different possible partial disclosing policies
will increase exponentially. In order to provide a picture about the nature of
the problem, I will start the discussion with the simplest case where Q = {1, 2}.
In this case, there are only two possible severities for the disease. The govern-
ment has to decide to choose the policy of disclosing or the policy of concealing
ex ante. If the policy of disclosing is implemented, the value of the objective
function is
φ1w(f(1)) + φ2w(f(2)) (16)
Otherwise, the value of the objective function is
(φ1 + φ2)w(
φ1f(1) + φ2f(2)
φ1 + φ2
) (17)
If the function w(x) is concave (convex) in [f(1), f(2)], (16) is smaller (greater)
than (17) and the optimal policy is to disclose (conceal). I obtain this result
because, when w(x) is convex in [f(1), f(2)], if the increase of the transmission
rate from the less severe state to the expected state is equal to the increase
of the transmission rate from the expected state to the more severe state, the
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difficulty increment is smaller in the former change than in the latter change.
Thus, the more severe state increases the difficulty more than the less severe
state reduces the difficulty and ex ante expected welfare is lower with disclosure.
The insight from the analysis of a two-state case carries over to a general
case where Q = {1, 2, ...,M}.
Proposition 1 Suppose the cost of leaving experiences a decreasing return on
the expected transmission rate, that is w′′(x) < 0 for all x ∈ [f(1), f(M)]. Then
it is optimal for the government to fully disclose. If the situation is reversed,
that is w′′(x) > 0 for all x ∈ [f(1), f(M)], then it is optimal for the government
to fully conceal.
This proposition is analogous to the discussion in the above mentioned two-
state case and serves as the basis for the full disclosure and the full non-disclosure
policies in the next section. The idea is that, if the difficulty of leaving is a
concave function of the expected transmission rates, the expected difficulty of
leaving is smaller under the full disclosure policy. The reason is as follows.
Suppose that a partial disclosure or a full non-disclosure policy is implemented.
Then there exists at least one signal in the policy profile that can be partitioned
into two nonempty signals. The expected transmission rate implied by the signal
before being partitioned (pooled state) is higher than the expected transmission
rate by one of the signals after being partitioned (low state), but it is lower than
by the other signal after being partitioned (high state). With a decreasing rate,
the difficulty increment from revealing the high state would be smaller than the
difficulty decrement from revealing the low state. In other words, the benefit
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increment from ‘no news’ to ‘good news’ is larger than the benefit decrement
from ‘no news’ to ‘bad news’. Thus, there should be no signal in the optimal
policy profile that can be partitioned into two, nonempty signals, and it leads
to the full disclosure policy. In contrast to a concave function, if the difficulty
of leaving is a convex function of the expected transmission rates, the difficulty
decrement from the low state to the pooled state will be dampened so that it
is lower than the difficulty increment from the pooled state to the high state.
Thus, the pooled state is preferred and it leads to the full non-disclosure policy.
The key of the analysis is the tradeoff between the concern of controlling
panic and the concern of the safety for the people inside the city. By revealing
information, it leads to a higher cost of panic in case of a severe state, but
increases the chance of survival for the people inside the city. By concealing
information, the potential panic from revealing a more severe state is controlled
at the price of the safety of the people inside the city. When the difficulties of
leaving exhibit a decreasing rate, the concern of the safety for the people inside
the city dominates the concern of controlling panic. Disclosure, by emphasizing
the concern of the safety for the people inside the city, increase the social welfare.
Conversely, with a increasing rate, the concern of controlling panic becomes
dominant and a policy with less accuracy is preferred. Thus, the full non-
disclosure policy, by conveying the least amount of information, increases ex
ante welfare.
As shown in the discussion, the crucial part of the problem is the nature of
the function w(x). In the following section, I will focus on the characteristics of
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w(x).
4.1 Properties of the Function w(x)
Define wmc(x) = w′(x), which is the marginal cost of leaving in terms of the
expected transmission rates, and wac(x) =
w(x)
x
, which is the average cost of
leaving in terms of the expected transmission rate. Assume there exists, at
most, one value l such that v′(l) = 0 or t′(l) = +∞.
Lemma 3 The functions wmc(x) and wac(x) satisfy:
1. 0 < wmc(x) ≤ wac(x)
2. dwac(x)
dx
≤ 0
Lemma 4 reflects that as the expected transmission rate increases, the av-
erage cost of leaving decreases, but it always remains higher than or equal to
the marginal cost of leaving. Lemma 4 provides us an important observation.
Despite the cost of leaving increases as the higher signal is announced, the aver-
age cost of leaving keeps decreasing. This is due to the fact that at equilibrium
the average costs of leaving are the probabilities of encountering an infected
individual when staying, which can be easily derived from (8). Since the prob-
abilities of encountering an infected individual when staying decrease as more
individuals leave, the average difficulties of leaving go down as well.
Proposition 2 For a sufficiently small ε > 0, w(x) is concave in [0, ε].
Proposition 2 shows that w(x) increases with an initial decreasing rate. Re-
call from Proposition 3 that the decreasing rate favors disclosure policy. So long
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as the transmission rates are sufficiently low that they all occur in the region
with the initial decreasing rate, the expected difficulty of leaving is reduced by
disclosure policy and the government should fully disclose. This occurs because
when the transmission rates are small, a small proportion of people leave the
city, which in turn triggers a high probability of encountering an infected in-
dividual for the people inside the city and a low cost of leaving. Under this
circumstance, disclosure, even in case of a severe state, would not elicit a large
cost of leaving. Thus, the concern of the safety for the people inside the city is
more important than the concern of controlling panic. As a result, disclosure,
by encouraging more people to leave, improves the social welfare.
Proposition 3 Suppose there exists a x˜ ∈ (0, 1] such that wmc(x˜) = wac(x˜).
Then there exists a xˆ ∈ (0, x˜) such that w(x) is strictly convex in [xˆ, x˜]; for a
sufficiently small ε, w(x) is strictly concave in [x˜, x˜+ ε].
Proposition 6 generates a sufficient condition under which there exists a
range of convexity in w(x).18 It identifies the upper boundary of a convex
range for w(x), x˜, which occurs when the marginal cost of leaving is equal to
the average cost of leaving. Since w(x) is concave initially, there must be a
threshold after which w(x) shifts away from concavity to convexity and the
shift can happen many times. The w(x) with x˜ and xˆ is illustrated in Figure
1. Proposition 6 also shows that x˜ is an inflection point where w(x) shifts
from convexity to concavity. A counter example is given in Figure 2. The
18 Note that although the existence of x˜ is not a necessary condition for a convex
range to exist, it is necessary to have a point at which wmc and wac are close
enough in order to have a convex range with a decent length.
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Figure 4: Illustration of xˆ and x˜
w(x) cannot have the full convexity as shown in Figure 2 because the property,
wmc(x) ≤ wac(x), is violated for x > x˜.
Since the convexity favors non-disclosure policy, the restriction on the convex
range limits the situations where the government should conceal. Therefore,
depending on the values of all the transmission rates, full disclosure policy may
still be optimal even there is a range of convexity.
This section illustrates two important characteristics of the function w(x),
the initial decreasing rate and the increasing rate before x˜. The initial decreasing
rate always occurs, and accounts for the situations where disclosure is optimal.
The increasing rate occurs when the marginal cost of leaving is equal to the
average cost of leaving, and can make the prospect of disclosure unfavorable.
Both the initial decreasing rate and the increasing rate before x˜, in conjunction
with the transmission rates, determine whether disclosure or nondisclosure is
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Figure 5: A counter example of w(x)
optimal. The next section examines the effects from the initial decreasing rate
and the increasing rate before x˜ and characterizes the situations where the full
disclosure or the full non-disclosure policies shall be implemented.
5 Optimal Full Disclosure (Non-Disclosure) Anal-
ysis
In this section, I examine the situations where w(x) is globally concave and the
situations where x˜ exists so that w(x) exhibits a convex range.
Proposition 4 Suppose t′′(l) < 0 and v′′(l) < 0 for all l ∈ [0, 1]. Then the
government’s optimal policy is to disclose fully.
Proof. The second order derivative of the inverse function of w(x) is
d2x
dw(x)2
= −2v
′t′−1
v2
+
t′−12(2v′2 − v′′v)− v′t−1′′v
v3
w (18)
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Given t′(l) ≥ 0 and v′(l) ≤ 0, the first term of (18) is always nonnegative
and the second term is unambiguous. When t′′(l) < 0 and v′′(l) < 0, both
terms are nonnegative, so d
2x
dw(x)2 ≥ 0. Also, we know dxdw(x) > 0 by Lemma 4.
Therefore, w(x) is concave globally. By Proposition 3, it is always better for
the government to partition the signal into two non-empty signals when w(x) is
concave globally. Therefore, the only optimal policy is the full disclosure policy.
What t′′(l) < 0 and v′′(l) < 0 imply are that the incremental disadvantage
from more people leaving becomes smaller and the incremental advantage from
more people leaving becomes larger. In other words, the marginal loss from
panic is smaller and the marginal benefit from people’s precautionary action
is larger with more people leaving. Because of the decreasing marginal cost
(t′′(l) < 0) and the increasing marginal benefit (v′′(l) < 0), disclosure in case
of the low state brings out more benefits than does nondisclosure in case of the
high state and thus increases ex ante expected welfare.
As reflected in (18), there are two terms that influence the sign of d
2x
dw(x)2 .
The first one, which accounts for the fact of the initial decreasing rate of w(x), is
always positive. The second term, depending on the function forms of v(l) and
t(l), can be either positive or negative and may trigger a range of increasing rate
for w(x) if it is negative. Since the effect of the initial decreasing rate always
favors disclosure policy, what remains to determine the optimal policy is the
sign of the second term. Under the condition of proposition 7, the second term
is nonnegative too, thus both terms favor disclosure policy and the government
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discloses the information fully.
Proposition 5 Suppose there exist a x˜ and a xˆ as defined in Proposition 6 such
that f(1) ≥ xˆ and f(M) ≤ x˜. Then, it is optimal for the government to fully
conceal.
Proposition 8 is an immediate consequence of proposition 6. It establishes
a sufficient condition for situations where the government reveals nothing. The
condition says that if the values of all the transmission rates fall in the convex
range of w(x), it is better off for the government to fully conceal information.
It is because, at x˜, the marginal cost of leaving reaches the higest value locally.
Within the region right before x˜, the incremental advantage from more people
leaving becomes so trivial compared with the incremental disadvantage caused
by the panic. Therefore, the concern of controlling panic becomes more impor-
tant and the severe panic cost is alleviated by revealing nothing when serious
outbreak occurs.
Since x˜ is a crucial point to trigger the non-disclosure policy, the character-
istic of x˜ is derived as follows:
Proposition 6 Suppose there exists a x˜ as defined in Proposition 6. Then there
must exist a lv ∈ (0, 1] such that v′(lv) = 0 and t(lv)v(lv) ≤ 1 or a lt ∈ (0, 1] such
that t′(lt) = +∞ and t(lt)v(lt) ≤ 1. And we have x˜ =
t(lv)
v(lv)
or x˜ = t(lt)
v(lt)
. (Under
the assumption that there exists, at most, one value l such that v′(l) = 0 or
t′(l) = +∞, lv and lt can not exist simultaneously.)
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Proposition 6 states that x˜ exists at either l = lv or l = lt. At lt, a slight in-
crease in the proportion of people leaving results in a dramatic increase of panic.
At lv, a large increase in the proportion of people only causes a minor decrease
of the probability of encountering an infected individual. In reality, if the pub-
lic’s action reaches lt, a slightly larger proportion of people leaving could cause
gas price to skyrocket or even loss of life. During hurricane Rita, the massive
evacuation caused knife fights among evacuees over the cans of petrol resulting
in the deaths of 55 people totally. Therefore, when the announcements induce
individuals’ action close to one of the breakdown points, lt or lv, disclosure will
not be optimal.
This section examines different situations where disclosure and nondisclosure
are optimal. The analysis is based on two distinct effects, the initial decreasing
rate effect and the increasing rate effect. The first effect favors disclosure policy
and exists for any function forms of v(l) and t(l) under the assumptions. The
second effect causes the disclosure policy less desirable and takes place when
the second term of d
2x
dw(x)2 is negative enough to offset the first term of
d2x
dw(x)2 .
This is more likely to occur when t(l) experiences very fast increasing or v(l)
experiences very slow decreasing at a certain point. When there is only initial
decreasing rate effect, the disclosure of the more severe state brings out more
benefits than does the nondisclosure of the less severe state and thus increases
expected welfare. On the other hand, if the increasing rate effect exists and the
values of all the transmission rates fall in the region where w(x) is convex, it
arises more benefits by preventing the public from knowing the serious state,
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so concealing policy is optimal. However, so long as the initial decreasing effect
is sufficiently large and the values of all the transmission rates fall in the range
of initial decreasing rate, the disclosure policy still increases ex ante expected
welfare even if there is a range of increasing rate for w(x).
6 Externality Effects Comparative Analysis
This section characterizes how the disclosing policies are affected as the func-
tions of payoff externalities change. Because of the fact that panic costs and
rates of contact among individuals vary among different groups and in different
locations, the same information disclosing plan may lead to different outcomes.
For example, the cost of people leaving from a small city could be much different
from the cost of people leaving from a big city like New Orleans. So how should
governments adjust their information disclosing policies in order to suit various
locations and population groups? The answers may contribute to the study of
situations like Katrina.
Intuitively, the smaller the change of incremental disadvantage from leaving
and the larger the change of incremental advantage from leaving, it is more
likely for the disclosure policy to be optimal. In this section, I work out two
examples to provide analysis on how w(x) transforms as t(l) and v(l) change
individually. During the analysis, the conditions under which the government
is indifferent between disclosure and non-disclosure are also indicated. Because
of the difficulty of doing comparative analysis for a w(x) with a convex range,
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I chose simple function forms for t(l) and v(l) which generate a concave w(x).
However, the insight provided by the analysis carries over to a w(x) that is
convex in a limited range as well.
Example 6 I assume t(l) = lα (α > 0) and v(l) = 11+l for all l ∈ [0, 1]. After
plugging t(l) and v(l) into (14), the first- and second order derivatives of the
inverse function of w(x) are
w−1′(x) = 1 +w
1
α +
1
α
w
1
α
w−1′′(x) = (1 +
1
α
)
1
α
w
1
α
−1
Proposition 7
1. lim
α→0
w−1′(x) = 1 and lim
α→0
w−1′′(x) = 0
2. lim
α→∞
w−1′(x) = 2 and lim
α→∞
w−1′′(x) = 0
3. Given a pair of values (x0, w0),
dw−1′′(x0)
dα
≥ 0 if α ∈ (0, −2−lnw0+
√
4+(lnw0)2
2 ]
and dw
−1′′(x0)
dα
< 0 if α ∈ (−2−lnw0+
√
4+(lnw0)2
2 ,+∞).
Example 7 I assume t(l) = l
1
2 and v(l) = 1
1+lβ
(β > 0) for all l ∈ [0, 1].
Similarly, the first- and second order derivatives of the inverse function of w(x)
are
w−1′(x) = 1 +w2β + 2βw2β
w−1′′(x) = (2β + 4β2)w2β−1
Proposition 8 1. lim
β→0
w−1′(x) = 2 and lim
β→0
w−1′′(x) = 0
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2. lim
β→∞
w−1′(x) = 1 and lim
β→∞
w−1′′(x) = 0
3. Given a pair of values (x0, w0),
dw−1′′(x0)
dβ
≥ 0 if β ∈ (0, −2−lnw0−
√
4+(lnw0)2
4 lnw0
]
and dw
−1′′(x0)
dβ
< 0 if α ∈ (−2−lnw0−
√
4+(lnw0)2
4 lnw0
,+∞).
The characterizations in both propositions are stated in terms of the inverse
function of w(x). The implications of w(x) are followed immediately. These
two propositions imply that (i) when t(l) or v(l) converges to fixed values,
the function w(x) becomes linear and the government is indifferent between
the revealing and the concealing policies. The reason is straightforward. At
equilibrium, people are indifferent between staying and running away. The
utility of people inside the city is the same as the utility of people who run
away. Therefore, if either side of people’s utility is constant, so is the utility
of the other side and the social welfare; (ii) given a point (x0, w0) on w(x), as
α starts moving away from zero, the degree of concavity in w(x) at that point
increases as t(l) becomes more concave. However, as α gets larger, concavity
starts fading away in t(l) and w(x) continues to be more concave at that point
until w−1′′(x) reaches the highest value. After that, w(x) gradually becomes
linear at that point. Proposition 8 provides similar results in terms of the effects
of v(l). The function w(x) experiences from being linear to being concave, then
return to be linear as v(l) transforms from being a fixed value to being concave,
then to being convex and eventually becomes a fixed value again; (iii) w(x)
always lies between x and x2 as v(l) and t(l) change. If either t(l) or v(l) is
curved upward extremely, w(x) = x. Conversely, w(x) = x2 .
Another interesting result shown in these examples is that although t′′(l) > 0
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and v′′(l) > 0, w(x) can still be concave. Thus, disclosure can still increase
ex ante welfare even when the disadvantage from disclosing increases at an
increasing rate and the advantage from disclosing increases at a decreasing rate.
It is because, in both examples, the second term of d
2x
dw(x)2 is not negative enough
to offset the first term of d
2x
dw(x)2 . Therefore, there is no increasing rate effect and
the only initial decreasing rate effect causes the disclosure policy to increase the
ex ante expected welfare.
In many Asian countries, since the populations are larger and the evacuat-
ing measures are less advanced, evacuation of the same proportion of people
may trigger a larger cost of leaving than it might in other countries. When a
serious outbreak occurs, the situation in Asian countries is more likely to reach
the breakdown point where the caused panic increases dramatically. Thus, dis-
closure can be a bad thing from the point of view of controlling panic. On
the other hand, since their populations are very concentrated and the rates of
contact among individuals much higher compared with the rest of the world,
evacuation in the population’s more concentrated areas tends to have a larger
impact on the well-beings of the individuals who stay. Therefore, it is less likely
for them to experience the situation where an increase in the public’s precau-
tionary actions hardly improves the danger of the epidemic’s center. In this
regard, the disclosure policy is more likely to be favorable in these population
concentrated places. An interesting study would be to choose two locations and
empirically analyze both externality effects and see to what extent that each
factor affects the government’s information releasing policies.
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7 Other Applications
This paper uses a simple and general setup that allows me to apply the model
to many situations such as threats of terrorism, and natural disasters like hur-
ricanes and earthquakes.
There have been many papers that attempt to measure the insecurity and
assess its effects in the study of terror threats. By applying my model, I link the
natures of public panic and precautionary action with the optimal information
revealing strategies and provide insights for dealing with the problem from a dif-
ferent aspect. The panic cost of revealing the danger of terror threats emerges
from the fact that individuals act in response to the changed probability to sur-
vive. Since individuals respond to the danger inappropriately, it remains to the
government to determine what is the appropriate level of action (it is the pro-
portion of people leaving in the model) and triggers it by choosing the correct
information revealing strategy. The m in my model represents the level of the
terror threat. The f(m) can be considered as the probability to survive if ter-
rorists attack successfully. The v(l) can represent the probability that terrorists
will attack successfully. The t(l) can represent the cost of precautionary actions
taken by people. When more people are involved in precautionary actions, it
creates more obstacles for terrorists, hence it reduces the probability of attack.
However, the precautionary action is costly to each individual and its cost can
carry on to other individuals. For example, the enhanced ‘911’ calls caused by
the worry of a potential attack may take attention from other emergencies. The
analysis on how to reveal the level of the terror threat follows the same suit as
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the epidemic example.
Natural disasters like hurricanes and earthquakes have similar characteristics
as epidemic disease. Public disclosure on the scale of disaster can affect the
population movement and accumulation of necessitates, which can harm the
social welfare. Therefore, by providing the appropriate information against
disaster, the government can achieve the appropriate action by individuals and
control the potential damage caused by overreaction. Related literature can
be found in regional science on location choice and land use behavior under
uncertainty. Viscusi (1987) takes the information provision into account in
the discussion of land use and location choice. In the paper, each individual
formulates a perceived risk of disaster. He shows that the difference between
perceived risk and objective risk accounts for the difference of the welfare in
two regions. However, his studies didn’t take the government’s information
revelation policy into account.
8 Concluding Remarks
This paper provides a disclosure model with payoff externalities and examines
the impacts of both payoff externalities upon polices which influence the social
welfare. In the model, disclosure has potential benefits by allowing the public to
take precautionary actions while at the same time induces cost from panic. The
paper focuses on information revelation aspects and provides a general analysis
on information revelation strategies on different situations. The findings are as
72
follows:
First, it is optimal to disclose fully if the difficulties people experience when
leaving increases at a decreasing rate and the probabilities of encountering an
infected individual decreases at an increasing rate. This is due to the fact
that the precautionary actions have a larger impact in increasing the safety of
the epidemic center than increasing the panic cost when more people leave. So
keeping people away becomes a more important concern than trying to alleviate
the panic. In this case, full disclosure, by encouraging more people to leave,
improves the social welfare.
Second, I analyze two effects that influence the optimal disclosing policy, the
initial decreasing rate effect and the increasing rate effect. The initial decreasing
rate effect favors disclosure policy and exists for any function forms of payoff
externalities. The increasing rate effect favors nondisclosure policy and exists
when, at a certain point, the difficulties from leaving increase at an extremely
large rate or the probabilities encountering an infected individual decrease at an
extremely small rate. In the presence of the increasing rate effect, depending on
the function forms of payoff externalities, as well as the values of all the trans-
mission rates, it may still be optimal to fully disclose if all the transmission rates
are small enough to fall in the region with the initial decreasing rate. However, if
the transmission rates occur in the region with the increasing rate, disclosing the
more severe state triggers larger costs than not disclosing the less severe state
does, thus disclosure decreases the ex ante expected welfare. Owing to the strict
conditions for the increasing rate effect to take place, disclosure can increase the
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ex ante expected welfare even when the marginal cost of precautionary actions
increases and the marginal benefit of precautionary actions decreases. This find-
ing is surprising, considering the conventional understanding that nondisclosure
is preferred if the incremental advantage becomes smaller and the incremental
disadvantage becomes larger as more information is disclosed. It is indeed the
case if the payoff externalities are formed such that the increasing rate effect is
generated.
Meanwhile, I also characterize how the disclosing policies are affected as
the function forms of the payoff externalities change. I show that when either
function converges to a constant value, the government is indifferent between
disclosure and nondisclosure. The advantage of disclosure gradually appears
as their functions become more concave, and eventually fades away as both
functions transform from being concave to being convex.
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Appendix A: Appendix for Chapter I
Proof of Theroem 1. Adopting the arguments by EMW (1983), one can easily
show the above strategies are an equilibrium outcome. Given b ∈ (r,E(V |V <
v], bidder U’s expected payoff if he wins is
E(V |β(V ) < b)− b = E(V |V < β−1(b))− b
Since b > r, we have β−1(b) > v˜ which implies
β(β−1(b)) = E(V |V < β−1(b))
and thus,
E(V |β(V ) < b) = b
So bidder U earns zero profit if he randomly chooses a bid from (r,E(V |V < v]
and he is indifferent between bidding and not bidding. Bidder U cannot bid r
at equilibrium because he wins only when v < v˜, then his expected payoff is
E(V |V < v)− r < E(V |V < v˜)− r = 0
Therefore, U will never bid r.
Now let’s consider bidder I. Given b ∈ [r,E(V |V < v], bidder I’s expected
payoff is
(v − b)H(b) (19)
Substituting H(b) = F (β−1(b)) into (19), we have
(v − b)F (β−1(b))
Employing a direct revelation mechanism, the expected payoff transforms to
(v − β(z))F (z) (20)
Differentiating (20) with respect to z yields
f(z)v − d
dz
(F (z)β(z)) (21)
Notice that for all z ∈ [v˜, v], both β(z) and
∫
z
r
tf(t)dt
F (z) are contained in [r,E(V |V <
v] and monotonically increasing in z. So I express β(z) =
∫
z
r
tf(t)dt
F (z) , then sub-
stituting β(z)F (z) with
∫ z
r
tf(t)dt in the first order derivative. This results
in
f(z)v − zf(z) (22)
The expression (22) is non-negative for z < v and non-positive for z > v. Thus,
the optimal response is to choose z = v when v ∈ [v˜, v]. When v ∈ [r, v˜], (22) is
non-positive for all z ∈ [v˜, v], so A’s optimal response is to bid β(v˜) = r.
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The proof of being the unique equilibrium is essentially the same as the one
given by EMW (1983).
Proof of Lemma 3. Let b
¯
and b¯ be the minimal and maximal element of
BI respectively. Consider a bid b by bidder U, if b <b
¯
, bidder U will lose for
certain; if b > b¯, bidder U can be better off by bid slightly lower than b. If BI
is continuous, we have BI ⊇ BU obviously. If BI is not continuous, so that for
some b˜ ∈ [b, b¯], b˜ /∈ BI . Then for all b˜, bidder U is better off bidding b = max{
b|b < b˜ and b ∈ BI }. Thus, we have BI ⊇ BU as well. The proof of bidder U’s
bidding distribution above r follows closely the one in the one period game.
Proof of Theorm 3. Suppose there exists a threshold v∗1 above which bidder I
bids and below which bidder I waits. If v1 > v∗1 , according to Lemma 2, bidder
I bids β1(v1) = Ev1 + E2 when Ev1 + E2 > r and bids r otherwise. Following
similar proof as in Theorem 1, in order to induce such strategies from bidder I
in the first round, bidder B has to follow the same distribution above the reserve
price. Thus, the equilibrium strategies above the reserve price in the first round
follow. If the auction moves to the second round, the game becomes a one
shot game. According to Theorem 1 and 2, the equilibrium strategies in the
second round can be verified easily too. Hence, what remains to be proven is
the threshold value for any given reserve price and the equilibrium strategies at
the threshold value.
I start with case 2. Suppose the threshold v̂1 > v
∗
1 , according to Lemma 2,
the support of bidder I’s bids in the first round is [Ev̂1 + E2, E1 + E2]. Given
E(V1|V1 < v∗1) + E(V2|V2 < v2) = r and v̂1 > v∗1 , we have Ev̂1 + E2 > r. So
bidder U’s expected payoff in the first period by bidding r is
E(V |β1(V1) < r)− r = E(V |V1 < v̂1)− r
= E(V1|V1 < v̂1) +E(V2|V2 < v2)− r > 0
According to Theorem 2, we know that the uninformed bidder cannot earn a
positive expected payoff. Therefore, the threshold cannot be above v∗1 . Now
suppose there exists a threshold v̂1 < v
∗
1 , by Lemma 2, the support of bidder I’s
bids in the first round will be [r,E1 +E2]. Since
E(V |V < v) = E(V1|V1 < v̂1) +E(V2|V2 < v2) < r,
by Theorem 2 bidder I will bid r when v1+v2 ≥ r and B does not bid at the sec-
ond period. So for v1 ∈ (v̂1, v∗1), if bidder I decides to wait, his expected payoff is
γ′
∫ max(v2, r−v1)
max(0, r−v1)
(v1 + v2 − r)dF2(v2) (23)
(γ′ represents the probability that bidder U does not bid in the first round.); if
he decides to bid in the first round, he will bid r because of his monotonically
increasing strategies. Note that bidder U can not bid r in the first round because
he earns negative profit when v1 ∈ (v̂1, v∗1). So the probability that I will
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win by bidding r is γ′ and his expected payoff by bidding r in the first round
is
γ′(v1 +E2 − r) (24)
For v1 ∈ (v̂1, v∗1), (23) ≥ (24) which implies bidder I will not bid in the first
round when v1 ∈ (v̂1, v∗1). Therefore, v̂1 cannot be the equilibrium threshold and
v∗1 is the only possible threshold existed at equilibrium for case 2.
Now I will show v∗1 is indeed the threshold value for bidder I and also prove
the equilibrium strategies at the reserve price in this case. First, suppose bidder
U does not possess a mass point at the reserve price in the first round. Let γ
represent U’s probability of not bidding in the first round. At v∗1 , bidder I’s
expected payoff if he bids in the first round is γ(v1+E2−r), while if bidder I waits
until the second round, his expected payoff is γ
∫max(v2, r−v1)
max(0, r−v1)
(v1+v2−r)dF2(v2).
As shown earlier, γ(v1 + E2 − r) ≤ γ
∫max(v2, r−v1)
max(0, r−v1)
(v1 + v2 − r)dF2(v2) for all
v1. Since bidder I has to be indifferent between bidding in the first round and
waiting till the second round at v∗1 , this can not be the equilibrium strategies.
Now consider the case when bidder U possess a mass point at the reserve price
in the first round. The reason why U can possess a mass point is that when the
threshold is v∗1 bidder I bids the reserve price only at v
∗
1 , thus by bidding the
reserve price U’s expected payoff if he wins is
E(V |V1 < v∗1)− r = E(V1|V1 < v∗1) +E(V2|V2 < v2)− r = 0.
Let p and γ be the probabilities of bidding r and not bidding in the first round
by bidder U. Assume each bidder gets the object with the probability equal to
1
2 when there is a tie. Then, bidder I’s expected payoff if he bids in the first
round turns into (γ + p2 )(v
∗
1 +E2 − r), while the expected payoff if he waits till
the second round remains the same. Since γ(v1+E2−r) ≤ γ
∫max(v2, r−v1)
max(0, r−v1)
(v1+
v2−r)dF2(v2) for all v1, it follows that there must exist an unique pair of values
for γ and p such that
γ + p = F1(v
∗
1)
(γ + p2)(v
∗
1 +E2 − r) = γ
∫max(v2, r−v∗1 )
max(0, r−v∗1 )
(v∗1 + v2 − r)dF2(v2).
Hence, v∗1 can be the threshold value for bidder I and the result follows.
Now consider case 1 and case 3. In case 1, suppose v∗1 > 0, according to
Lemma 2, bidder I always bids above the reserve price. So bidder U’s expected
payoff in the first period by bidding r is
E(V )− r = E1 +E2 − r.
Since r ≤ E2, E(V ) − r > 0. Bidder U will always bid the reserve price, so I’s
equilibrium strategies in the first round can not hold. Thus, v∗1 must be 0. In
case 3, bidder U never participates. So if bidder I bids in the first round he bids
the reserve price and the expected payoff is
v1 +E2 − r;
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if he waits till the second round his expected payoff is
∫ max(v2, r−v1)
max(0, r−v1)
(v1 + v2 − r)dF2(v2).
The rest of the proof is exactly the same as the one in case 2 and the result
follows.
Proof of Theorem 4. The proofs for case 2 and 3 are exactly the same as
the ones given in Theorem 1 and 2, thus they are omitted. In case 1, since
Ev1 + v2 ≥ r for all v1, bidder I always bids and his bids range from v2 to
Ev∗∗1 + v2. Using the same argument as the one used in proving case 2, one
can show that, in order to induce such strategies from bidder I, bidder U has
to randomly choose a bid according to the same distribution, which implies the
result.
Proof of Theorem 5. The proof follows similar steps as the proof of Theorem
3. If bidders bid in the first round, according to Lemma 2, bidder I bids Ev1+E2
when Ev1 + E2 > r and bids r otherwise; according to Theorem 1, bidder U
follows the same distribution except possible at r and 0. If the auction moves to
the second round, bidders bid according to the strategies provided in Theorem
4. Thus, the crucial step is to prove the threshold value.
I start with case 2. Firstly, v∗∗1 can not be greater than v
∗∗
1 . The proof of
that is exactly the same as the one given in the proof of Theorem 3. Hence, if
there exists a threshold, it must be that v∗∗1 ∈ [r − E2, v∗1 ]. At the threshold, if
bidder I bids in the first round, his expected payoff is
v∗∗1 +E2 − r; (25)
if he waits till the second round, his expected payoff is
∫ r−Ev∗∗
1
max(0,r−v∗∗1 )
(v∗∗1 + v2 − r)dF2(v2) +
∫ v¯2
r−Ev∗∗
1
(v∗∗1 −Ev∗∗1 )dF2(v2). (26)
Let D = (25)− (26). Suppose v∗∗1 = r −E2, then,
D = −
∫ r−Ev∗∗1
max(0,r−v∗∗1 )
(v∗∗1 + v2 − r)dF2(v2)−
∫ v¯2
r−Ev∗∗1
(v∗∗1 −Ev∗∗1 )dF2(v2)
= −
∫ r−Ev∗∗1
E2
(v2 −E2)dF2(v2)−
∫ v¯2
r−Ev∗∗1
(r −E2 −Ev∗∗1 )dF2(v2).
By definition, E2 +Ev∗1 = r, thus r−E2 −Ev∗1 = 0. Since Ev∗1 ≥ Ev∗∗1 , one has
r − E2 − Ev∗∗1 ≥ 0. So the second term of the above expression is nonpositive.
Since the first term of the above expression is nonpositive obviously, we have
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D ≤ 0. Now suppose v∗∗1 = v∗1 , then,
D = v∗1 +E2 − r −
∫ r−Ev∗1
max(0,r−v∗1)
(v∗1 + v2 − r)dF2(v2)−
∫ v¯2
r−Ev∗
1
(v∗1 −Ev∗1 )dF2(v2)
≥ v∗1 +E2 − r −
∫ r−Ev∗1
max(0,r−v∗1)
(v∗1 −Ev∗1 )dF2(v2)−
∫ v¯2
r−Ev∗1
(v∗1 −Ev∗1 )dF2(v2)
= v∗1 −Ev∗1 −
∫ v¯2
max(0,r−v∗1 )
(v∗1 −Ev∗1 )dF2(v2)
= (v∗1 −Ev∗1 )F2(max(0, r − v∗1))
≥ 0.
Thus, we have D ≥ 0. Also, one can easily show that ∂D
∂v∗∗1
> 0. Hence, there
must exist an unique v∗∗1 ∈ [r−E2, v∗1 ] such that D = 0 which implies the result
in case 2. The proof for case 3 is essentially the same as the one for case 2.
The only difference is that v∗∗1 ∈ [r−E2, 1] instead since I never bids above the
reserve price. At v∗∗1 = r − E2, D ≤ 0 still holds. However, at v∗∗1 = 1, one
might see D ≤ 0. This implies that bidder I is always better off by waiting till
the second round, thus we have v∗∗1 = 1 under some situations. In case 1, since
r ≤ E2, v∗∗1 ∈ [0, 1]. At v∗∗1 , bidder I’s expected payoff if he bids in the first
round is v∗∗1 − Ev∗∗1 , if he waits till the second round his expected payoff is the
same as expression (26). Thus, the difference of the expected payoff between
bidding and waiting is
D = v∗∗1 −Ev∗∗1 −
∫ r−Ev∗∗1
max(0,r−v∗∗1 )
(v∗∗1 +v2−r)dF2(v2)−
∫ v¯2
r−Ev∗∗
1
(v∗∗1 −Ev∗∗1 )dF2(v2).
Since E2 + Ev∗∗1 ≥ r, it follows that
D = v∗∗1 −Ev∗∗1 −
∫ r−Ev∗∗1
max(0,r−v∗∗1 )
(v∗∗1 + v2 − r)dF2(v2)−
∫ v¯2
r−Ev∗∗1
(v∗∗1 −Ev∗∗1 )dF2(v2)
≥ v∗∗1 −Ev∗∗1 −
∫ r−Ev∗∗1
max(0,r−v∗∗1 )
(v∗∗1 −Ev∗∗1 )dF2(v2)−
∫ v¯2
r−Ev∗∗1
(v∗∗1 −Ev∗∗1 )dF2(v2)
≥ 0.
This implies that bidding in the first round is always more favorable for I than
waiting till the second round. Thus, v∗∗1 = 0 and the result follows.
The following lemmas are provided for Proposition 8 and 9.
Lemma 4 1. When r ∈ [0, 12 ], RI = 2
∫ 1
0
1+v1
2 v1dv1.
2. When r ∈ ( 12 , 1), RI = 2
∫ 1
2r−1
1+v1
2 v1dv1 +
∫ 2r−1
r− 12
r(2r − 1)dv1.
3. When r ∈ [1, 32 ], RI = r(32 − r).
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Lemma 5 1. When r ∈ [0, 13 ], RNII = 2
∫ 2
v∗
(v2− v33 − 13) 2−(2−v)
2
2 d
2−(2−v)2
2 +
r 2−(2−v
∗)2
2 [
2−(2−v∗)2
2 − r
2
2 ]
where v∗ satisfies v∗2 − v∗33 − 13 = r.
2. When r ∈ (13 , 1), RNII = 2
∫ 1
v∗
v3
3
v2
2 d
v2
2 +2
∫ 2
1
(v2−v33 −13)2−(2−v)
2
2 d
2−(2−v)2
2 +
r v
∗2
2 (
v∗2
2 − r
2
2 )
where v∗ = (3r)
1
3 .
3. When r ∈ [1, 2], RNII = r (2−r)
2
2 .
Lemma 6 1. When r ∈ [0, 12 ], RDII =
∫ 1
r
( 13 + v2)dv2 +
∫ r
0
(13 + v2 + (r −
v2)
2(−2r3 − 4v23 ))dv2.
2. When r ∈ ( 12 , 1), RDII =
∫ 1
r
(13 + v2)dv2 +
∫ r
r− 12
(13 + v2 + (r − v2)2(−2r3 −
4v2
3 ))dv2 +
∫ r−12
0 r(1− r + v2)dv2.
3. When r ∈ [1, 32), RDII =
∫ 1
r−12
(13+v2+(r−v2)2(−2r3 − 4v23 ))dv2+
∫ r− 12
r−1
r(1−
r + v2)dv2.
4. When r ∈ [32 , 2], RDII =
∫ 1
r−1 r(1− r + v2)dv2.
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Appendix B: Appendix for Chapter II
Proof of Lemma 2. To prove this lemma, I introduce another result which is
stated as follows: Let m1 and m2 be such that m1,m2 ∈ Q and 0 < m1 < m2 ≤
M, one can easily show
f(m1)φm1
φm1
<
f(m1)φm1 + f(m2)φm2
φm1 + φm2
<
f(m2)φm2
φm2
.
Consequently, for m, m˜ and m ∈ Q such that 0 < m < m˜ < m ≤M , I have
m˜∑
m=m
f(m)φm
m˜∑
m=m
φm
<
m∑
m=m
f(m)φm
m∑
m=m
φm
<
m∑
m=m˜
f(m)φm
m∑
m=m˜
φm
. (27)
By (10),
t(lSi)
v(lSi)
=
∑
m˜∈Si
f(m˜)φm˜∑
m˜∈Si
φm˜
and
t(lS˜i)
v(lS˜i)
=
∑
m˜∈S˜i
f(m˜)φm˜∑
m˜∈S˜i
φm˜
.
Since S˜i is the lower tail of Si, by (27), it must be that∑
m˜∈S˜i
f(m˜)φm˜∑
m˜∈S˜i
φm˜
≤
∑
m˜∈Si
f(m˜)φm˜∑
m˜∈Si
φm˜
.
Given t′ ≥ 0 and v′ ≤ 0, t(l)
v(l) is increasing in l. Therefore, lS˜i ≤ lSi . Similarly,
lS˜j ≥ lSj . Since S˜i and S˜j contain an equal number of elements and s˜i(k) ≥
s˜j(k), by (27), it follows that lS˜i ≥ lS˜j . Finally, I have lSi ≥ lSj .
Proof of Proposition 1. By definition, w(x) = t(g−1(x)) and g(l) = t(l)
v(l) .
Also, it is assumed that t′ ≥ 0 and v′ ≤ 0. Thus, w(x) is increasing in x. When
w′′(x) < 0 for all x ∈ [f(1), f(M)], w(x) is concave. Suppose that a partial
disclosure or a full non-disclosure policy is implemented under w′′(x) < 0. Then
there exists at least one signal that contains more than one state. Since, by
definition,
xi =
∑
m˜∈Si
f(m˜)φm˜∑
m˜∈Si
φm˜
for a given signal Si, the transmission rate implied by the signal with more than
one state will be the average of the transmission rates if the signal were to be
partitioned into two nonempty signals. With a decreasing rate, the expected
value of w(x) would be smaller by partitioning the signal with more than one
state. To minimize the expected value of w(x), there should be no signal in
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the policy profile that contains more than one element. Thus, it is optimal for
the government to full disclose. The proof for the opposite situation, that is
w′′(x) > 0 for all x ∈ [f(1), f(M)], follows the similar logic.
Proof of Lemma 3. Since w(x) = t(g−1(x)) and g(l) = t(l)
v(l) , I have
x
w(x)
=
1
v(t−1(w(x)))
. (28)
Differentiating x with respect to w yields
dx
dw
=
1
v(t−1(w))
− v
′(t−1(w))t−1′(w)w
v(t−1(w))2
. (29)
Since v′ ≤ 0 and t−1′ ≥ 0, the second term of (29) is always nonnegative.
Therefore,
dx
dw
≥ x
w(x)
.
This implies
w′(x) ≤ w(x)
x
.
Using the same conditions v′ ≤ 0 and t−1′ ≥ 0, one can easily prove that
w′(x) > 0 and dwac(x)
dx
≤ 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. Recall from (18) the second order derivative of the
inverse function of w(x) is
d2x
dw(x)2
= −2v
′t′−1
v2
+
t′−12(2v′2 − v′′v)− v′t−1′′v
v3
w. (30)
Given t′(l) ≥ 0 and v′(l) ≤ 0, the first term of (30) is always nonnegative and the
second term is zero at w = 0. Thus, d
2x
dw(x)2 |w(x)=0 ≥ 0. Also, I have dxdw(x) > 0
and x = 0 at w(x) = 0. Therefore, w−1(x) is convex in [0, ε]. Consequently,
w(x) is concave in [0, ε]
Proof of Proposition 3 and 6. The condition wmc(x˜) = wac(x˜) implies
dx˜
dw(x˜)
=
x˜
w(x˜)
(31)
After plugging (28) and (29) into (31), I have
v′(t−1(w(x˜)))t−1′(w(x˜))w(x˜)
v(t−1(w(x˜)))2
= 0
Since w(x˜) = 0 at x˜ = 0, either v′(t−1(w(x˜))) or t−1′(w(x˜)) must be zero.19 If
v′(t−1(w(x˜))) = 0, there must exist a lv such that v
′(lv) = 0 and
t(lv) = w(x˜). (32)
19We cannot have v′(t−1(w(x˜))) = t−1′(w(x˜)) = 0 because of the assumption that there exists
at most one value l such that v′(l) = 0 or t′(l) = +∞.
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Solving (32) yields x˜ = t(lv)
v(lv)
. Similarly, I have x˜ = t(lt)
v(lt)
if t−1′(w(x˜)) = 0. (Since
x˜ represents a transmission rate, both t(lv)
v(lv)
and t(lt)
v(lt)
cannot be greater than 1.)
Thus, Proposition 6 is proved.
Now let’s consider Proposition 3. When t−1′(w(x˜)) = 0, it follows that
t−1′(w(x)) > 0 for all x /∈ x˜ because of the assumptions that t−1′(w(x)) ≥ 0
and there exists at most one value l such that v′(l) = 0 or t′(l) = +∞. Then,
t−1′′(w(x˜)) must be zero. Similarly, v′′(t−1(w(x˜))) = 0 when v′(t−1(w(x˜)))
= 0. Thus, d
2x
dw(x)2 |w(x)=w(x˜) = 0. Suppose w(x) is concave in [x˜ − ε, x˜] if ε is
sufficiently small, then I have
wmc(x˜− ε) > wmc(x˜)
which implies
dx˜
dw(x˜)
>
d(x˜− ε)
dw(x˜− ε) .
By (28) and (31),
dx˜
dw(x˜)
=
1
v(t−1(w(x˜)))
<
1
v(t−1(w(x˜+ ε)))
<
d(x˜+ ε)
dw(x˜+ ε)
.
Thus, I have
d(x˜− ε)
dw(x˜− ε) <
dx˜
dw(x˜)
<
d(x˜+ ε)
dw(x˜+ ε)
(33)
The (33) contradicts d
2x
dw(x)2 |w(x)=w(x˜) = 0. Thus, wmc(x˜−ε) can not be greater
than wmc(x˜). Suppose wmc(x˜−ε) = wmc(x˜). Because wac(x˜) = wmc(x˜), wmc(x˜−
ε) must be equal to wac(x˜− ε). Then
v′(t−1(w(x˜− ε)))t−1′(w(x˜− ε))w(x˜− ε)
v(t−1(w(x˜− ε)))2 = 0
So either v′(t−1(w(x˜ − ε))) or t−1′(w(x˜ − ε))w(x˜ − ε) has to be zero, which
violates the assumption that there exists at most one value l such that v′(l) = 0
or t′(l) = +∞. Therefore, wmc(x˜ − ε) < wmc(x˜) and w(x) is strictly convex
in [x˜ − ε, x˜]. Because w(x) is concave initially, there must exist a threshold
after that w(x) changes from being concave to being convex. The first part of
Proposition 3 is proved. The proof of the second part of Proposition 3 is as
follows: Suppose, for a sufficiently small ε, wmc(x˜ + ε) ≥ wmc(x˜). Based on
the results in Lemma 3, I have wac(x˜) ≥ wac(x˜ + ε). Since wmc(x˜) = wac(x˜),
it follows that wmc(x˜ + ε) ≥ wac(x˜ + ε) which is either a contradiction to the
results in Lemma 3 or a violation of the assumption that there exists at most
one value l such that v′(l) = 0 or t′(l) = +∞. Thus, wmc(x˜+ ε) < wmc(x˜) and
w(x) is strictly concave in [x˜, x˜+ ε].
Proof of Proposition 5. Proposition 5 is a restatement of part of Proposition
1 and 3, so its proof is omitted.
84
Proof of Proposition 7. Since w ≤ 1, I have lim
α→0
w
1
α = 0 and
lim
α→0
w
1
α
α
= lim
x→+∞
xwx = lim
x→+∞
x
w−x
= lim
x→+∞
(x)′
(w−x)′
= lim
x→+∞
1
−w−x lnw = − limx→+∞
wx
lnw
= 0.
Then it follows that
lim
α→0
w
1
α
−1
α
= 0 andlim
α→0
w
1
α
α2
= 0.
Hence, the results in the case 1 are proved. Since lim
α→+∞
w
1
α = 1 and lim
α→+∞
1
α
w
1
α =
0, the results in the case 2 follow immediately.
To prove the results in the case 3, dw
−1′′(x0)
dα
is derived as follows
dw−1′′(x0)
dα
= − 1
α3
w
1
α
−1
0 − (1 +
1
α
)
1
α2
w
1
α
−1
0 − (1 +
1
α
)
1
α3
w
1
α
−1
0 lnw0 (34)
= w
1
α
−1
0 [−2α−3 − α−2 − (α−3 + α−4) lnw0].
Solving (34)≥ 0 yields
α ∈ [−2− lnw0 −
√
4 + (lnw0)2
2
,
−2− lnw0 +
√
4 + (lnw0)2
2
].
Because
−2−lnw0−
√
4+(lnw0)2
2 < 0 and α > 0 by the assumption, it follows
that dw
−1′′(x0)
dα
≥ 0 if α ∈ (0, −2−lnw0+
√
4+(lnw0)2
2 ] and
dw−1′′(x0)
dα
< 0 if α ∈
(
−2−lnw0+
√
4+(lnw0)2
2 ,+∞). Thus, the results in the case 3 are proved.
Proof of Proposition 8. The proofs for both case 1 and case 2 follow the
same lines as the proofs of Proposition 7 and are omitted here. To prove the
results in the case 3, dw
−1′′(x0)
dβ
is derived as follows
dw−1′′(x0)
dβ
= (2 + 8β)w2β−10 + 2(2β + 4β
2)w2β−10 lnw0 (35)
= w2β−10 [2 + 8β + 2(2β + 4β
2) lnw0].
Solving (35) ≥ 0 yields
β ∈ [2 + lnw0 −
√
4 + (lnw0)2
−4 lnw0 ,
2 + lnw0 +
√
4 + (lnw0)2
−4 lnw0 ].
Because
2+lnw0−
√
4+(lnw0)2
−4 lnw0
< 0 and β > 0 by the assumption, it follows
that dw
−1′′(x0)
dβ
≥ 0 if β ∈ (0, 2+lnw0+
√
4+(lnw0)2
−4 lnw0
] and dw
−1′′(x0)
dβ
< 0 if β ∈
(
2+lnw0+
√
4+(lnw0)2
−4 lnw0
,+∞). Thus, the results in the case 3 are proved.
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